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THE CHANGING FEDERAL STANDARD FOR
JUDGING INEFFECTIVENESS OF COUNSEL
In United States v. Easter, ' the Eighth Circuit
Court of Appeals held that "trial counsel fails
to render effective assistance when he does not
exercise the customary skills and diligence that
a reasonably competent attorney would per-
form under similar circumstances. '2 In articu-
lating this standard, the court in Easter appears
to have rejected the standard announced seven
years earlier in Cardarella v. United States3 which
allowed a charge of ineffective assistance of
counsel to prevail only if the representation
afforded the defendant by his counsel was such
as to make the proceedings "a farce and a
mockery of justice, shocking to the conscience
of the Court. ' 4 If it has indeed adopted a new
1 539 F.2d 663 (8th Cir. 1976).
2 Id. at 666. The Supreme Court has held that the
sixth amendment right to counsel is the right to the
effective assistance of counsel. McMann v. Richard-
son, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n.14 (1970) ("It has long been
recognized that the right to counsel is the right to
the effective assistance of counsel."). See Glasser v.
United States, 315 U.S. 60, 76 (1942); Powell v.
Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 53 (1932). This right extends
only to criminal matters. Taylor v. Sterrett, 532 F.2d
462, 472 (5th Cir. 1976). See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418
U.S. 539, 576 (1974).
3 375 F.2d 222 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 882
(1967).
41 Id. at 230 (quoting O'Malley v. United States, 285
F.2d 733, 734 (6th Cir. 1961)). This lenient standard
for gauging ineffectiveness of counsel was common
among the federal circuits at the time of Cardarella.
See, e.g., Bottiglio v. United States, 431 F.2d 930, 931
(lst Cir. 1970) ("such as to make the trial a mockery,
a sham or a farce"); Wright v. Craven, 412 F.2d 915,
918 (9th Cir. 1969) ("reduce the trial to a sham");
Johnson v. United States, 380 F.2d 810 (10th Cir.
1967); United States v. Bella, 353 F.2d 718, 719 (7th
Cir. 1965). It was first enunciated in Diggs v. Welch,
148 F.2d 667, 670 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 325 U.S.
889 (1945), where the court said:
We do not belive that allegations even of serious
mistakes on the part of an attorney are ground
for habeas corpus standing alone. The cases
where the Surpeme Court has granted habeas
corpus on the ground that there was no fair
trial support this interpretation of the absence
of effective representation. They are all cases
standard, the Eighth Circuit has joined the
majority of United States courts of appeals.
Over the last sixteen years, six other circuits
have abandoned the "farce or mockery of jus-
tice" standard in favor of a more stringent
standard for testing the effectiveness of coun-
sel.
The newer standard has been phrased in
various ways. The Fifth and Sixth Circuits have
defined "effective counsel" as "counsel reason-
ably likely to render and rendering reasonably
effective assistance." 5 The Third Circuit has
defined it as "the exercise of the customary
skill and knowledge which normally prevails at
the time and place,"' or as "normal compe-
tency."7 The Seventh Circuit has held that a
criminal defendant must be provided with "le-
gal assistance which meets a minimum standard
of professional representation. '"8 The Fourth
Circuit has enumerated specific requirements
and noted that an omission or failure to comply
with the requirements constitutes a denial of
where the circumstances surrounding the trial
shocked the conscience of the court and made
the proceedings a farce and a mockery ofjustice.
5 McDonald v. Estelle, 536 F.2d 667, 670 (5th Cir.
1976) (appeal pending); United States v. Fessel, 531
F.2d 1275, 1278 (5th Cir. 1976); United States v.
Goodwin, 531 F.2d 347, 348 (6th Cir. 1976); Beasley
v. United States, 491 F.2d 687, 696 (6th Cir. 1974);
MacKenna v. Ellis, 280 F.2d 592, 599 (5th Cir. 1960),
cert. denied, 368 U.S. 877 (1961). But see Cavett v.
United States, 545 F.2d 486, 488 (5th Cir. 1977);
Akridge v. Hopper, 545 F.2d 457, 459 (5th Cir. 1977)
("within the range of competence demanded of attor-
neys in criminal cases") (quoting McMann v. Richard-
son, 397 U.S. 759 (1970)).
6 United States ex rel. Johnson v. Johnson, 531
F.2d 169, 174 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 997
(1976) (quoting Moore v. United States, 432 F.2d
730, 736 (3d Cir. 1970) (en banc)).
7 Moore v. United States, 432 F.2d 730, 737 (3d
Cir. 1970) (en banc).
8 United States ex rel. Spencer v. Warden, Pontiac
Correctional Ctr., 545 F.2d 21, 22 (7th Cir. 1976);
United States ex rel. Ortiz v. Sielaff, 542 F.2d 377,
379 (7th Cir. 1976); United States v. Merritt, 528 F.2d
650 (7th Cir. 1976); United States ex rel. Williams v.
Twomey, 510 F.2d 634, 641 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
423 U.S. 876 (1975).
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effective representation of counsel.' And the
District of Columbia Circuit has both set forth
specific duties owed by counsel to a client and
adopted as a standard the principle that "a
defendant is entitled to the reasonably compe-
tent assistance of an attorney acting as his
diligent conscientious advocate."1°
The path which the Eighth Circuit has fol-
lowed in moving from Cardarella to Easter is a
path laced with contradiction, ambiguity and
equivocation." In Cardarella, the court consid-
ered an application for post-conviction relief in
which the petitioner claimed that he was denied
effective assistance of counsel because his attor-
ney had failed to discover two police reports
made by a government witness. The attorney
had also failed to urge on appeal alleged error
in permitting the jury to separate and various
exceptions to the trial court's charge to the
jury. Considering the issue of effective counsel
as a due process question, the Cardarella court
focused on whether the representation af-
forded the petitioner by his counsel, taken as a
whole, was adequate and the trial fair. In
concluding that the petitioner had received a
fair trial, the court held that the test of fairness
was met so long as "what was or was not done
by the defendant's attorney for his client [had
not made] the proceedings a farce and a mock-
ery of justice, shocking to the conscience of the
Court. 1 2 The alleged errors made by Carda-
rella's counsel did not constitute ineffective
representation under this standard.
Two years later the court, in Scaif v. Bennett, 13
' Coles v. Peyton, 389 F.2d 224 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 393 U.S. 849 (1968).
"0 United States v. DeCoster, 487 F.2d 1197, 1202
(D.C. Cir. 1973). United States v. Hurt, 543 F.2d
162, 165 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
" Only a month before the court of appeals deci-
sion in Easter, a district court judge maintained that
the court of appeals had actually articulated several
ineffectiveness standards. In a twenty-three page
appendix to his opinion, entitled "Ineffective Assist-
ance of Counsel: The Multiple Rules of the Eighth
Circuit and the Increasing Need for Reconsideration
and Guidance by the Court of Appeals en Banc," he
urged the court of appeals to clarify its position. See
Garton v. Swenson, 417 F. Supp. 697, (W.D. Mo.
1976).
" 375 F.2d at 230 (quoting O'Malley v. United
States, 285 F.2d 733, 734 (6th Cir. 1961)). In O'Malley
the appellant contended that he was denied the
effective assistance of counsel because his attorney
did not use witnesses whom the appellant claimed
would have testified in his behalf.
13 408 F.2d 325 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 887
(1969).
further developed the Cardarella standard:
Habeas corpus relief on the ground of incompe-
tency of counsel or denial of effective counsel
will be granted "only when the trial was a farce,
or a mockery of justice, or was shocking to the
conscience of the reviewing court, or the pur-
ported representation was only perfunctory, in
bad faith, a sham, a pretense, or without ade-
quate opportunity for conference and prepara-
tion .14
The Cardarella standard was applied again in
1971 in Robinson v. United States." Rephrasing
Cardarella's "farce or mockery of justice" test,
the Robinson court held that:
In order to assert a Sixth Amendment infirmity
on this ground [ineffective assistance of counsel],
the circumstances must demonstrate that which
amounts to a lawyer's deliberate abdication of
his ethical duty to his client. There must be such
conscious conduct as to render pretextual an
attorney's legal obligation to fairly represent the
defendant.16
In neither Scaif v. Bennett nor Robinson v.
United States was the attorney's conduct found
to violate the "farce or mockery of justice"
standard. The court in Scaif rejected the appel-
lant's contention that his counsel did not effec-
tively represent him in his appeal to the Su-
preme Court of Iowa. The petitioner in Robin-
son alleged that he was denied effective assist-
ance of counsel because his counsel wrongfully
recommended that he not take the stand to
testify on his own behalf and refused to cause
compulsory process to issue for two absent
witnesses. The court refused to judge the attor-
ney's trial tactics in hindsight. It noted that one
of the absent witnesses had been interviewed
and had stated that he could not help the
petitioner, while the other absent witness could
not be located.
From 1967 through 1971, the Eighth Circuit
resolutely applied Cardarella's "farce or mock-
ery of justice" standard in assessing the validity
of claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.
By 1974, however, the "farce or mockery" stan-
dard was the subject of attack by various com-
mentators,'17 and the Eighth Circuit showed
14 d. at 327-28 (quoting White v. McHam, 386
F.2d 817, 818 (5th Cir. 1967)).
15 448 F.2d 1255 (8th Cir. 1971).
16 Id. at 1256.
17 See, e.g., Bines, Remedying Ineffective Representa-
tion in Criminal Cases: Departures from Habeus Corpus,
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signs of sensitivity to the charge of permitting
"inexcusably sloppy lawyering."' In McQueen
v. Swenson,' 9 the court explained that the
"mockery of justice" standard was not as harsh
a standard as might have appeared:
Stringent as the "mockery of justice" standard
may seem, we have never intended it to be used
as a shibboleth to avoid a searching evaluation
of possible constitutional violations; nor has it
been so used in this circuit. It was not intended
that the "mockery of justice" standard be taken
literally, but rather that it be employed as an
embodiment of the principle that a petitioner
must shoulder a heavy burden in proving unfair-
ness.
20
But the McQueen court was not yet ready to
abandon its use of the "farce or mockery"
standard. On the facts before the court, there
was no need to consider a different standard.
Defense counsel's failure to interview any of
the prosecution's forty-one witnesses or call
any defense witnesses other than the defendant
constituted ineffective assistance of counsel
even under the "farce or mockery" standard.
The court therefore declined to decide
"whether ... to follow the trend set by the
Third, Fourth, Fifth and District of Columbia
Circuits and adopt a standard of 'reasonably
competent' representation. ' 21 The court did,
however, review at length the existing situation
in the four circuits that had by then abandoned
the old standard, suggesting that by 1974 the
-Eighth Circuit was giving serious consideration
to the question of whether to retain the "farce
or mockery of justice" standard.
The court concluded that evaluation of a
habeas corpus petition alleging ineffective as-
sistance of counsel involved a two-step process:
First, a court must determine "whether there
has been a failure to perform some [essential]
duty ... owed by a defense attorney to his
client," and, second, "whether that failure prej-
udiced his defense .''2 Assuming a breach of
duty by counsel, the court considered the issue
of which party should bear the initial burden
of establishing prejudice. After reviewing the
position of other circuits that had expressed a
59 VA. L. REV. 927 (1973); Finer, Ineffective Assistance
of Counsel, 58 CORNELL L. REV. 1077 (1973).
8 McQueen v. Swenson, 498 F.2d 207, 214 n.10
(8th Cir. 1974).
"9 498 F.2d 207 (8th Cir. 1974).20Id. at 214.
21 Id. at 214-15.
22Id. at 218.
view on this issue, the McQueen court adopted
what it termed a "flexible approach" to the
problem.2 3 Under this approach, the defendant
would normally have the btorden of proving
prejudice. But if changed circumstances since
the original proceedings, or trial counsel's in-
adequate performance, have made it impossi-
ble for the defendant to prove prejudice, then
the burden would shift to the state. Under the
McQueen court's application of the "farce or
mockery" test and its flexible approach to the
issue of prejudice, the defendant still bore a
heavy burden, but it was no longer as over-
whelming as it appeared to be under the Car-
darella test. Thus, although purporting to ad-
here to the Cardarella standard, the Eighth
Circuit, in McQueen, actually took its first step
toward abandoning that standard.
In Carton v. Swenson, 24 the court again em-
phasized that its "mockery of justice" language
was merely an embodiment of the principle
that an appellant shoulders the heavy burden
of proving unfairness. The petitioner in Gar-
ton alleged that his trial counsel failed to pro-
vide effective assistance because they were un-
aware of a state statutory procedure providing
for compulsory attendance of out-of-state wit-
nesses. As a result, petitioner's counsel failed
to subpoena four out-of-state witnesses whose
testimony would have substantially supported
the petitioner's alibi defense. Although again
explicitly declining to depart from the "farce
or mockery" standard, the Garton court never-
theless reversed the district court's denial of a
writ of habeas corpus and remanded for an
evidentiary hearing, noting that:
We have based our decisions concerning effec-
tiveness of counsel upon the particulars of each
case. The standard for effectiveness is not easily
reduced to precise words capable of rigid appli-
cation.26
This ad hoc approach, which was later applied
in other Eighth Circuit cases, 27 seems a further
indication of the court's movement away from
the lenient Cardarella standard.
The decision in Garton was delivered only
2Id. at 220.
24 497 F.2d 1137 (8th Cir. 1974).
25 Id. at 1139.
26 Id. at 1140.
27 See Wolfs v. Britton, 509 F.2d 304 (8th Cir.
1975); Johnson v. United States, 506 F.2d 640 (8th
Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 978 (1975). See also,
United States ex rel. Johnson v. Johnson, 531 F.2d
169, 174 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 977 (1976).
[Vol. 68
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one week after McQueen. Together, these two
cases implied that a failure to make a reasona-
ble investigation would amount to ineffective
assistance of counsel under the then-existing
standard of the circuit, a standard which, de-
spite the implications of the court to the con-
trary,2 seemed more stringent than that artic-
ulated in Cardarella3 9 But, five months later,
in Johnson v. United States,30 the court rejected
the appellant's claim that he was denied effec-
tive representation of counsel because his trial
counsel failed to fully investigate and prepare
for trial and failed to spend sufficient time and
effort during trial to convince the appellant to
refrain from testifying. After reiterating Gar-
ton's principle that "the standard for effective-
ness is not easily reduced to precise words
capable of rigid application," the court con-
cluded that the complained-of conduct fell far
short of meeting the ineffective assistance of
counsel standard, however that standard might
be phrased. Counsel for Johnson had fully
discussed the case with his client, had thor-
oughly reviewed the government's file and,
unlike counsel in Garton, had contacted all
witnesses suggested by his client and used them
where beneficial.
Chief Judge Gibson, speaking for the court,
declared that the Eighth Circuit continued to
adhere to the standard applied in Cardarella
and, moreover, that the court had adhered to
the Cardarella standard in Mc Queen. And yet,
the Chief Judge went on to observe that: "A
more appropriate nomenclature for the stan-
dard would be to test for the degree of compe-
tence prevailing among those licensed to prac-
tice before the bar. '31 Once again, although
claiming to adhere to the Cardarella standard,
the court was apparently suggesting that a
more stringent standard would be more appro-
priate.
Five months prior to the decision in Easter,
two three-judge panels of Eighth Circuit judges
issued inconsistent decisions which no doubt
caused district court judges a great deal of
consternation. In Coney v. Wyrick,32 the circuit
497 F.2d at 1139-40.
29 According to the court of appeals in Garton, the
district court had erred by reading too narrowly
prior decisions applying the "mockery of justice"
standard. Id. at 1139.
30 506 F.2d 640 (8th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420
U.S. 978 (1975).
31 Id. at 646.
32 532 F.2d 94 (8th Cir. 1976).
court explicitly relied on the "mockery of jus-
tice, shocking to the conscience" standard in
rejecting a claim of ineffective representation.
The petitioner, who was convicted of murder,
claimed that he was denied the effective assist-
ance of counsel because his attorney did not
object to the admission of confessions, and did
not request a new trial or make a direct appeal.
After citing McQueen for the proposition that
the "farce or mockery" standard was not to be
taken literally, the court held that the petitioner
had failed to shoulder that standard's heavy
burden of proving unfairness. The court ex-
plained that it was not until four years after
Coney's trial that the Missouri Supreme Court
declared confessions such as Coney's to be
inadmissible, and that counsel's decision not to
request a new trial or make a direct appeal
may have been a calculated decision designed
to save his client from the death penalty. No
mention was made of McQueen's two-step proc-
ess for determining ineffectiveness, McQueen's
"flexible approach" for determining who has
the initial burden of establishing prejudice,
Garton's ad hoc approach or Chief Judge Gib-
son's remarks in Johnson.
One month later, the court issued a decision
in the case of Thomas v. Wyrick.33 The petitioner
in Thomas had been denied habeas corpus relief
by the district court, although his counsel had
admittedly failed to interview any of the prose-
cution's witnesses or any witnesses who might
have lent support to the petitioner's testimony
that he was not present at the time when the
crime was committed. The district court judge
had reviewed Eighth Circuit decisions and had
concluded that the circuit continued to adhere
to the "farce or mockery of justice" standard.
Applying this standard to what he character-
ized as a "close case," 34 the district court judge
denied relief, but stated that, were the applica-
ble standard "reasonably competent assistance
of counsel" the outcome would have been dif-
ferent. 35
Admitting that there had been some variance
in the language of its previous opinions and
that the proper standard was important in
determining this "close case, '36 the court of
appeals reviewed at length its prior decisions
33 535 F.2d 407 (8th Cir.), affg 417 F. Supp. 508
(E.D. Mo. 1975), cert. denied, 97 S.Ct. 178 (1976).
417 F. Supp. at 512.
5 Id.
36 535 F.2d at 411.
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on the issue of ineffectiveness of counsel. It
concluded that the case most similar to the
present one was McQueen. The court inter-
preted McQueen not only as reaffirming the
traditional "farce or mockery" standard, but
also as emphasizing that the "farce or mockery"
standard was not to be taken literally. It then
applied the McQueen court's two-step process
of first determining whether defendant's coun-
sel had failed to perform some essential duty
and then determining whether that failure
prejudiced the defense. The Thomas court an-
swered both of these questions in the affirma-
tive. By failing to interview any witnesses, coun-
sel had failed to perform an essential duty and
this failure prejudiced the defendant. The
court went on to explain that:
[W]here the attorney's breach of duty has been
serious, it is not necessary that the petitioner
demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence
that adequate representation would have pro-
duced an acquittal. The petitioner need only
shoulder the additional burden of showing that
the alleged error itself sufficiently undercut the
reliability of the trial process to have prejudiced
the petitioner's right to a fair trial.37
Although the court implied that it was still
applying the Cardarella standard, it is doubtful
whether counsel's conduct here would have
been grounds for reversal under that standard
or the standard of other cases prior to McQueen.
Judge Henley, in dissent, discussed the con-
fusing history of the ineffectiveness of counsel
issue in the Eighth Circuit and questioned
whether post-McQueen cases did not actually
indicate that the circuit had returned to the
"farce or mockery" standard of the older cases.
In fact, Judge Henley questioned whether the
circuit ever really departed from that standard.
His principle concern, however, was that the
court was not basing its decisions on any stan-
dard at all:
I fear . . . that what we may really be doing is
deciding cases of this kind by hindsight, on a
purely ad hoc basis, and without any real refer-
ence to any particular standard of the quality of
representation constitutionally required or relat-
ing to the extent of prejudice that will require a
reversal if representation has been inadequate
constitutionally. Such an approach, if it is being
taken, is in my view undesirable and unfair to
district judges, to state courts, and to lawyers
who represent defendants in criminal cases.38
37 Id. at 414.3
8Id. at 419-20 (Henley, J., dissenting). At least
Judge Henley went on to urge the court to
announce its adherence to a particular stan-
dard.
The court appeared to make such an
announcement in Easter. Easter contended
that he was denied the effective assistance
of counsel because his court-appointed at-
torney had failed to file a motion to sup-
press evidence obtained in an illegal search
of Easter's home and to object when the
improperly obtained evidence was intro-
duced at his trial. The court agreed, saying
that counsel's inaction was so "derelict" that
the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel
would be sustained.
3 9
In considering the standard to apply in
cases where a claim of ineffectiveness of
counsel is raised, the court said:
As we perceive the standard established in our
prior decisions it is that trial counsel fails to
render effective assistance when he does not
exercise the customary skills and diligence that a
reasonably competent attorney would perform
under similar circumstances. 40
And then, as though reluctant to fully abandon
the "farce or mockery" standard, the court
added:
When he fails in the performance of this duty
the proceedings may be said to have been re-
duced to a "farce" and "mockery of justice."4
The court did not admit that the standard it
applied in Easter was a new one.4 2 Yet an
analysis of Eighth Circuit decisions indicates
one district court judge agreed that the lack of a
single articulated standard was confusing:
[U]nder present circumstances a federal district
judge in this Circuit can have no "assurance as
to how his decision will be reviewed on appeal,"
as Judge Henley put it, because no one can
predict what panel of the Court of Appeals will
draw his decision for review.
Garton v. Swenson, 417 F. Supp. 697, 720 (W.D. Mo.
1976).
39 539 F.2d at 665.
40 Id. at 666.
4i Id. It is not unusual for a court of appeals, in
moving from the "farce or mockery" standard to the
"reasonably competent" standard to form a hybrid
of the two standards. See, e.g., Beasley v. United
States, 491 F.2d 687, 695 (6th Cir. 1974); Leano v.
United States, 457 F.2d 1208, 1209 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 889 (1972); Schaber v. Maxwell, 348
F.2d 664 (6th Cir. 1965).
42 539 F.2d at 666.
[Vol. 68
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that the standard announced in Easter was
significantly different from the standard ap-
plied in prior cases. Unlike the "farce or mock-
ery" standard of Cardarella, the "reasonable
competence" standard of Easter focuses on the
conduct of the defense attorney rather than on
the fairness of the trial. A defense attorney
renders ineffective assistance under the Easter
standard when the quality of his performance
falls below that of an attorney of reasonable
competence. Under the standard enunciated
in Scalf and in Robinson, an attorney's perform-
ance would have had to have been so incompe-
tent as to have amounted to no representation
at all before it would have been characterized
as ineffective.
Despite the attempt of the court in Easter to
tie the new standard to the old "farce or mock-
ery" standard, it clearly abandoned its earlier
attempts to ameliorate the impact of the old
"farce or mockery" standard by explaining that
it was not to be taken literally or that the
standard could not be reduced to precise words
capable of rigid application. No longer was the
Eighth Circuit standard some amorphous con-
cept to be applied on an ad hoc basis with
inconsistent results.
In Pinnell v. Cauthron,43 a panel of the Eighth
Circuit applied the "reasonably competent"
standard established in Easter to grant habeas
corpus relief, finding the defendant's attorney
to have been "grossly incompetent." The de-
fendant's attorney had put in very little time
preparing for trial, except for filing a few
routine motions. There was no communication
between counsel and client for at least thirty
days prior to trial. Four days prior to trial,
counsel attempted to withdraw from the case,
but his letter of withdrawal did not arrive until
after the trial had begun. After a call from the
court on the morning of the trial, counsel
arrived without the case file or even a note
pad. Counsel permitted prejudicial evidence to
be admitted when such evidence was clearly
inadmissible. Counsel made no opening state-
ment, no closing statement, no objections, and
cross-examined only one witness in a perfunc-
tory manner.
It is still too early to predict whether the
enunciation of the "reasonable competence"
standard in Easter and its application in Pinnell
indicate that the Eighth Circuit has finally ar-
rived at a definitive standard for gauging the
43 540 F.2d 938 (8th Cir. 1976).
effectiveness of counsel. The most recent
Eighth Circuit decision in this area, Harshaw v.
United States,44 seems to indicate that the circuit
still may not have settled upon a single stan-
dard. In Harshaw, a panel of Eighth Circuit
judges headed by Chief Judge Gibson issued a
per curiam opinion holding that:
To support an allegation of ineffective counsel
the record must contain some indication that
counsel was or may have been incompetent, i.e.
that counsel failed to perform some essential
duty and that the defense was prejudiced
thereby. See Thomas v. Wyrick, 535 F.2d 407
(8th Cir. 1976); McQueen v. Swenson, 498 F.2d
207 (8th Cir. 1974). 45
Harshaw alleged that he was denied effective
assistance because his counsel failed to conduct
a pretrial investigation, failed to object to pre-
judicial prosecutorial statements, and failed to
raise on appeal the points set forth in his
motion for a new trial. The court rejected
Harshaw's claim of ineffective representation,
concluding that the record contained no evi-
dence of what a pretrial investigation might
have produced, no indication of how its omis-
sion was prejudicial, and some indication that
such investigation would have been fruitless.
The prosecutor's remarks were not found to
be prejudicial and so failure to object to them
did not indicate incompetency. Finally, the
court relied on Cardarella for the proposition
that counsel is not under a duty to assert on
appeal every assignment of error embodied in
a motion for a new trial.
The court's reliance on McQueen and Thomas
is troublesome in that it indicates that the
"reasonable competence" standard of Easter
and Pinnell is not accepted by all the judges on
the court of appeals. Equally troublesome is
the denial of rehearing en banc in Harshaw.
One is left wondering whether the Eighth Cir-
cuit actually does intend to adopt a new stan-
dard for judging ineffectiveness of counsel.
Express adoption of the "reasonable compe-
tence" standard would align the Eighth Circuit
with the six circuits that have determined that
this standard most clearly protects the defend-
ant from the potentially devastating conse-
quences of ineffective representation. Courts
have increasingly come to realize the impor-
tance of effective representation and the obli-
44 542 F.2d 455 (8th Cirn 1976).4 5Id. at 456-57.
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gation of judges to ensure that such represen-
tation is afforded defendants in criminal cases.
They have also come to recognize that this vital
right to effective assistance of counsel emanates
not only from the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment, but also from the sixth
amendment. The "farce or mockery of justice"
standard originally developed when the courts
were considering the issue of effectiveness of
counsel solely within a due process, fundamen-
tal fairness framework. 6
The Supreme Court first enunciated the
right to effective assistance of counsel in Powell
v. Alabama,47 where it held that:
lit is the duty of the court ... to assign counsel
for [an indigent defendant in a capital case] as a
necessary requisite of due process of law; and
that duty is not discharged by an assignment at
such a time or under such circumstances as to
preclude the giving of effective aid in the prepa-
ration and trial of the case.
48
The trial court's failure to assign counsel who
could provide the defendant with effective aid
violated the due process clause of the four-
teenth amendment.
4 9
In Glasser v. United States50 the Court made it
" Dunker v. Vinzant, 505 F.2d 503 n.1 (1st Cir.
1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1003 (1975) ("[The 'farce
or mockery'] test has been said to rest on the theory
that the ineffectiveness claim is grounded in the due
process clause."); United States v. DeCoster, 487 F.2d
1197, 1202 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Scott v. United States,
427 F.2d 609, 610 (D.C. Cir. 1970) ("The 'farce and
mockery' standard derives from some older doctrine
on the content of the due process clause of the Fifth
Amendment."). See Cardarella v. United States, 375
F.2d 222, 232 (8th Cir. 1967) ("Perfect or errorless
counsel is not required as a prerequisite to a fair trial
consonant with due process.").
47 287 U.S. 45 (1932). For a further discussion of
the genesis of the right of effective assistance of
counsel, see Waltz, Inadequacy of Trial Defense Repre-
sentation as a Ground for Post-Conviction Relief in Crimi-
nal Cases, 59 Nw. U. L. REv. 289 (1964). -
48 287 U.S. at 71.4 1 Id. Lower courts read Powell narrowly to require
only the effective appointment of counsel. See cases
cited in Waltz, supra note 47, at 293 n.19. This
reading of Powell seems to have been substantially
repudiated by later Supreme Court decisions. See
McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759,771 n.14 (1970);
United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 227 (1967).
50 315 U.S. 60, 76 (1942) ("We hold that the court
... denied Glasser his right to have the effective
assistance of counsel guaranteed by the Sixth Amend-
ment."). See McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759,
771 n.14 (1970); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218,
227 (1967).
clear that the right to effective assistance of
counsel is also guaranteed by the sixth amend-
ment. Throughout the 1960's and early 1970's,
in a line of cases from Gideon v. Wainwright5" to
Argersinger v. Hamlin,12 the Court gradually
expanded the concept of right to counsel under
the sixth amendment as applied to the states
by the fourteenth amendment. 53 The courts of
appeals, following these Supreme Court deci-
sions, began to perceive the question of effec-
tive assistance of counsel as also a sixth amend-
ment issue,5 and they concluded that the "farce
or mockery" standard was no longer appropri-
ate.5 5 A newer standard was required, a stan-
51 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (sixth amendment requires
appointment of counsel for indigent defendants in
felony cases).
52 407 U.S. 25 (1972) (sixth amendment requires
appointment of counsel for indigent defendants in
misdemeanor cases resulting in imprisonment).
I See United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967)
(sixth amendment requires appointment of counsel
for indigent at post-indictment lineup).
4 See, e.g., United States ex rel. Reis v. Wainwright,
525 F.2d 1269, 1273 (5th Cir. 1976) ("the right to
effective assistance of counsel is safeguarded both by
the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
standing alone and by the Sixth Amendment guar-
antee of effective representation"); United States ex
rel. Williams v. Twomey, 510 F.2d 634, 640 (7th Cir.
1975) ("[P]etitioner was denied that effective legal
assistance which constitutes the due process of law
guaranteed by the due process clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment, or, as is sometimes said, the
assistance of counsel clause of the Sixth Amend-
ment."); Fitzgerald v. Estelle, 505 F.2d 1334, 1336
(5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 422, U.S. 1011 (1975);
Dunker v. Vinzant, 505 F.2d 503 n.2 (1st Cir. 1974),
cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1003 (1975) ("Although the
[reasonable competence] standard has been articu-
lated somewhat differently by the circuits which have
adopted it, they all agree that the standard is based
on the requirements of the Sixth Amendment.");
Beasley v. United States, 491 F.2d 687, 696 (6th Cir.
1974); United States v. DeCoster, 487 F.2d 1197, 1202
(D.C. Cir. 1973); Moore v. United States, 432 F.2d
730, 737 (3d Cir. 1970) (en banc); Scott v. United
States, 427 F.2d 609, 610 (D.C. Cir. 1970) ("The
'farce and mockery' standard derives from some
older doctrine on the content of the due process
clause of the Fifth Amendment. What is involved
here is the Sixth Amendment.").
The Eighth Circuit, in McQueen v. Swenson, 498
F.2d 207, 214 (8th Cir. 1974), explicitly declined to
resolve the question of whether the right to effective
assistance of counsel derives solely from the due
process clause, or whether it also derives from the
sixth amendment.
" See, e.g., Fitzgerald v. Estelle, 505 F.2d at 1336:
Moving from the Fourteenth Amendment alone
to the incorporated Sixth, our decisions establish
that the standard of reasonably effective assist-
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dard concomitant with the sixth amendment's
"more stringent requirements. ' 56 The Third
Circuit explained in Moore v. United States:
57
[W]e believe the increased recognition of the
constitutional right to the assistance of counsel
requires that the standard which prevails in
federal cases under the Sixth Amendment
should be applied equally to state convictions, to
which the same guarantee is made applicable by
the Fourteenth Amendment under Gideon v.
Wainwright. The standard of normal compe-
tency applies equally in each case.-"
Although clearly establishing that "the right to
counsel is the right to the effective assistance
of counsel,"1 9 the Supreme Court has provided
very little assistance to the circuits in their
struggle to arrive at a constitutionally appropri-
ate standard for judging ineffectiveness of
counsel. 60 Certain language in McMann v. Rich-
ardson61 gives a glimmer of insight into the
Supreme Court's position. In a discussion of
the standards to be applied for determining
whether a guilty plea on advice of counsel was
intelligently made, the Supreme Court recog-
nized that the competence of the advice given
by defense counsel is an important considera-
tion:
In our view a defendant's plea of guilty based
on reasonably competent advice is an intelligent plea
.... Whether a plea of guilty is unintelligent
... depends as an initial matter.., on whether
that advice [of counsel] was within the range of
competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases.
... [D]efendants facing felony charges are enti-
tied to the effective assistance of competent
counsel.62
ance of counsel ... covers a greater range of
counsel errors than does the fundamental fair-
ness standard of the due process concept solely
embodied within the Fourteenth Amendment.
-6 McQueen v. Swenson, 498 F.2d at 214; United
States v. DeCoster, 487 F.2d at 1202. See Scott v.
United States, 427 F.2d 609, 610 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
57 432 F.2d 730 (3d Cir. 1970).
5s Id. at 737.
9 McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. at 771 n.14.
0 McQueen v. Swenson, 498 F.2d at 214.
61 397 U.S. 759 (1970).
' Id. at 770-71 (emphasis added). In Tollett v.
Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 266 (1973), the Court
reaffirmed McMann's holding that a plea of guilty on
advice of counsel can be vacated on a showing that
defense counsel's advice was not "within the range of
competence demanded of attorneys in criminal
cases."
The Court went on to admonish trial court
judges as to the importance of ensuring that
defendants in criminal cases are represented
by competent counsel:
[I]f the right to counsel guaranteed by the Con-
stitution is to serve its purpose, defendants can-
not be left to the mercies of incompetent coun-
sel.... [J]udges should strive to maintain
proper standards of performance by attorneys
who are representing defendants in criminal
cases in their courts.63
It was this language in McMann that apparently
influenced some courts of appeals in their
decision to abandon the old "farce or mockery"
standard. The court of appeals in Easter,' for
example, quoted from McMann, as did the
Third,65 Sixth, 66 and District of Columbia
67
Courts of Appeals in the cases in which those
circuits adopted a new standard.
Chief Justice Burger's well-known view that
not every person admitted to the bar is quali-
fied to give effective assistance on every kind
of legal problem may also have influenced
some courts that have adopted the "reasonably
competent" standard. The Chief Justice has
openly criticized the legal profession for toler-
ating such a low calibre of proficiency among
its courtroom practitioners, and has specifically
proposed that the profession establish some
system of certification for trial advocates.68
Perhaps the most helpful source for courts
seeking to give substance to the term "effective
representation" has been the Standards for the
Defense Function promulgated by the Ameri-
can Bar Association.69 These standards are
. Id. at 771.
6' 539 F.2d at 666 n.2. See also McQueen v. Swen-
son, 498 F.2d at 215 & n.11.
65 See Moore v. United States, 432 F.2d at 737.
66 See Beasley v. United States, 491 F.2d at 693.
67 See United States v. Decoster, 487 F.2d at 1202.
68 Burger, The Special Skills of Advocacy: Are Special-
ized Training and Certification of Advocates Essential to
Our System ofjustice?, 42 FORDHAM L. REV. 227 (1973).
69 AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION PROJECT ON STAN-
DARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING
TO THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND THE DEFENSE
FUNCTION (Approved Draft, 1971). These standards,
which have received the approval of the ABA's House
of Delegates, are the product of a study conducted
by a distinguished committee chaired by Chief Justice
Burger. The Standards have been cited by a number
of the courts of appeals that have considered the
ineffectiveness of counsel issue. See, e.g., United
States v. Easter, 539 F.2d 663, 666 (8th Cir. 1976);
McQueen v. Swenson, 498 F.2d at 216 & n.12; United
States v. DeCoster, 487 F.2d at 1203-04.
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guidelines for the defense of criminal cases.
They express the legal profession's opinion as
to the calibre of service a defense attorney
should render to his or her client. One court
has incorporated these ABA Standards as gen-
eral guidelines for the defense of criminal cases
and has dictated specific duties owed by counsel
to a client, referring to particular sections of
the Standards.70
Unfortunately, until the Supreme Court
makes a definitive pronouncement on the stan-
dard to be applied in judging ineffectiveness
of counsel, the standard will continue to vary,
not only among circuits, but also within circuits,
as in the Eighth Circuit. There is clearly a
need for the Supreme Court to dispel the
uncertainty in this area by enunciating a consti-
tutional standard for judging ineffectiveness of
counsel. But the Court has repeatedly denied
certiorari in cases in which the issue was
raised. 71 As a result of this lack of guidance,
the "reasonable competence" standard is ap-
plied in six circuits while the "farce or mockery"
standard continues to prevail in the First, Sec-
ond, Ninth, Tenth, and possibly in the Eighth
Circuit.72 The injustice of such a situation is
evident when one realizes that the standard
70 See United States v. DeCoster, 487 F.2d at 1203-
04.
1 E.g., Thomas v. Wyrick, 535 F.2d 407 (8th Cir.),
cert. denied, 97 S.Ct. 178 (1976).
72 The Second and Tenth Circuits cling tenaciously
to the "farce or mockery" standard. See Lunz v.
Henderson, 533 F.2d 1322 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied,
97 S.Ct. 136 (1977); Robinson v. United States, 474
F.2d 1085, 1089 (10th Cir. 1973); United States ex rel.
Marcelin v. Mancusi, 462 F.2d 36, 42 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 410 U.S. 917 (1973); Neal v. United States,
438 F.2d 301 (10th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S.
979 (1971); Johnson v. United States, 380 F.2d 810
(10th Cir. 1967); United States v. Wight, 176 F.2d
376,379 (2d Cir. 1949),cert. denied, 338 U.S. 950 (1950).
The old standard also prevails in the First and
Ninth Circuits, although there is some discussion
indicating that a movement to the new standard may
be imminent. Compare de Kaplany v. Enomoto, 540
F.2d 975, 987 (9th Cir. 1976) ("Whether we use the
standard of performance so poor and incompetent
as to make the trial a farce or mockery of justice...
or of whether the circumstances show a denial of
fundamental fairness ... [or of] lack of counsel
likely to render and rendering reasonably effective
assistance .... the result is the same. Petitioner was
not deprived of the effective assistance of counsel.
Thus we need not choose between these standards.")
and Leano v. United States, 457 F.2d 1208, 1209 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 889 (1972) ("[A] conviction
may not be set aside on grounds of ineffective repre-
sentation of counsel unless service of counsel was of
applied can be determinative of the outcome
of a challenge to conviction on the ground of
ineffectiveness of counsel .73
Surely it is time to end the disparity. Not
only is it important that "some concrete content
. . .be given the Sixth Amendment guarantee
of effective assistance of counsel, ' 74 it is imper-
ative that there be an appropriate standard
which will apply whenever and wherever the
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is
raised in a criminal case.
DUE PROCESS RIGHTS IN PAROLE REvOCATION
PROCEEDINGS
Atwood v. Nelson, 75 a Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals review of a parole revocation proceed-
ing, is one in a series of recent cases which
have focused on the rights of parolees and
such a caliber as to amount to a farce or mockery of
justice .... To demonstrate inadequacy of counsel,
a petitioner must show that he had counsel who was
not reasonably likely to render and did not render
reasonably effective assistance.") with United States
v. Stem, 519 F.2d 521, 525 (9th Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 1033 (1976) ("so inadequate as to
make his trial a farce, sham, or mockery of justice")
and Wright v. Craven, 412 F.2d 915, 917 (9th Cir.
1969) ("farce or a mockery of justice"); and compare
United States v. Madrid Ramirez, 535 F.2d 125, 129-
30 (1st Cir. 1976) ("While we have considered adopt-
ing a more lenient standard requiring 'reasonably
competent assistance of counsel,' appellant's conten-
tions do not approach a violation of either standard.")
with Moran v. Hogan, 494 F.2d 1220, 1222 (1st Cir.
1974) ("such as to make the trial a mockery, a sham
or a farce.").
73 The choice of standards did prove to be deter-
minative in the decisions reached by the district court
judges in Thomas v. Wyrick, 417 F. Supp. 508 (E.D.
Mo. 1975), rev'd, 535 F.2d 407 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
97 S. Ct. 178 (1976), and in Garton v. Swenson, 417
F. Supp. 697, 705 n.8 (W.D. Mo. 1976).
1 Francis v. Henderson, 96 S. Ct. 1708, 1717 n.4
(1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting). In Francis, Mr. Jus-
tice Brennan argued that:
[I]f the Court [intends] . . .to bind the accused
by waivers by counsel, some concrete content
should be given the Sixth Amendment guaran-
tee of effective assistance of counsel and some
explanation made of what actually constitutes
action "within the range of competence de-
manded of attorneys in criminal cases."
Id. (quoting McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759,
771 (1970)). Although Francis did not involve a claim
of ineffective representation, Mr. Justice Brennan
nevertheless raised the ineffectiveness issue in his
dissenting opinion.
" 19 CRIM. L. REP. (BNA) 2243 (9th Cir. May 14,




other individuals within the penal system.7 6 At
issue was whether the lack of a preliminary
revocation hearing and the manner in which
the parole board conducted the final revocation
hearing violated minimum due process stan-
dards established by the United States Supreme
Court in Morrissey v. Brewer.7 7 Although its
opinion is cryptic and without extensive cita-
tion, the Atwood court may have gone beyond
prior cases and expanded the rights of parolees
to procedural due process in the context of
parole revocations.
The United States Supreme Court first rec-
ognized constitutionally guaranteed procedural
rights for parolees in Morrissey v. Brewer.7 8 Prior
to that decision, various courts had used the
right/privilege dichotomy 78 and the theories of
contract, 0 parens patriae8 l and constructive cus-
76 Moody v. Daggett, 429 U.S. 78 (1976); Meachum
v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215 (1976); Enomoto v. Cluc-
thette, sub nom. Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308
(1976); Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974);
Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973); Baker v.
Wainwright, 527 F.2d 372 (5th Cir. 1976); United
States v. Tucker, 524 F.2d 77.(5th Cir. 1975); Preston
v. Piggman, 496 F.2d 270 (6th Cir. 1974); United
States ex rel. LiPuma v. Gengler, 411 F. Supp. 948
(S.D.N.Y. 1976); MeGee v. Warden, U.S. Peniten-
tiary, 395 F. Supp. 181 (M.D. Pa. 1975); Wells v.
Wise, 390 F. Supp. 229 (C.D. Cal. 1975); United
States ex rel. Dereczynski v. Longo, 368 F. Supp. 682
(N.D. Ill. 1973), affd, 506 F.2d 1403 (7th Cir. 1974);
Brannum v. United States Bd. of Parole, 361 F.
Supp. 394 (N.D. Ga. 1973), afJ'd, 490 F.2d 990 (5th
Cir. 1974).
7 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
78Id.
7' The Supreme Court, speaking through Justice
Cardozo, held that a probationer whose suspended
sentence had been revoked had no constitutional
right to a hearing or trial in any formal sense because
"probation or suspension of sentence comes as an act
of grace." Id. at 492. Numerous lower federal courts
followed Cardozo's theory that parole and probation
were privileges administered as a matter of grace by
the executive branches of government. See Rose v.
Haskins, 388 F.2d 91 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 392 U.S.
946 (1968); Curtis v. Bennett, 351 F.2d 931 (8th
Cir.), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 958 (1965); Shaw v. Hen-
derson, 430 F.2d 1116 (5th Cir. 1970); Williams v.
Dunbar, 377 F.2d 505 (9th Cir. 1967); Gonzales v.
Patterson, 370 F.2d 94 (10th Cir. 1966).
s0 The contract theory developed from dictum in
United States v. Wilson, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 150 (1833),
where Justice Marshall said that a pardon became
effective only if the prisoner accepted its terms. Id.
at 161. Thus, a violation of the pardon constituted a
breach of the contract which the pardoned prisoner
had accepted. See Rose v. Haskins, 388 F.2d 91, 100
(6th Cir. 1968) (Celebrezze, J., dissenting); Bowers v.
Dishong, 103 F.2d 464 (5th Cir. 1939).
81 The parens patriae theory was based upon the
todys2 to deny parolees these safeguards. How-
ever, when parolee Morrissey petitioned for a
writ of habeas corpus claiming that his parole
had been revoked without a hearing, the Su-
preme Court rejected these earlier rationales
and determined that revocation of parole with-
out a hearing violated the due process clause
of the fourteenth amendment.s3 The decision
expanded earlier case law8 4 which had made
clear, in a different context, that a governmen-
tal procedure which potentially inflicts a "griev-
ous loss" upon a citizen cannot be exercised
without certain minimal procedural safe-
guards.85
The procedural safeguards suggested by the
Court in Morrissey provide for both a prelimi-
nary revocation hearing and a final revocation
hearing. According to the Court, the determi-
nation of a parole revocation involves two issues
which need to be considered separately:
whether there is probable cause that the paro-
lee has violated conditions of parole; and
whether the violation, after consideration of all
mitigating circumstances, mandates a revoca-
tion of parole.8 6 Each hearing is to be con-
ducted with reference to a fairly detailed list of
minimum safeguards, including written notice
of claimed violations, disclosure of evidence
parole authorities' role in overseeing the successful
rehabilitation of the parolee. Because the parolee
was still a convicted prisoner who did not have the
same rights as a "free man," he was subject to the
Parole Board's guardianship. Chief Justice (then
Judge) Burger stated that:
In a real sense the Parole Board in revoking
parole occupies the role of parent withdrawing
a privilege from an errant child not as punish-
ment but for misuse of the privilege.
Hyser v. Reed, 318 F.2d 225, 237 (D.C. Cir. 1963),
cert. denied sub nom. Thompson v. United States Bd.
of Parole, 375 U.S. 957 (1963).
82 Although not within the literal confines of
prison, the parolee was constructively within the
custody of the prison authorities and subject to their
power. E.g., Hyser v. Reed, 318 F.2d 225 (D.C. Cir.
1963); McCoy v. Harris, 108 Utah 407, 410, 160 P.2d
721, 722 (1945).
s3 Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 482.
8 Goldberg v. Kelley, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
s In Goldberg, aid to welfare recipients had been
terminated by state and municipal officials without
notice and without an evidentiary hearing. The Court
stated that the right/privilege dichotomy was an in-
sufficient rationale to support the denial of due
process. It indicated that whether procedural due
process applied to the recipients was influenced by
the extent to which they may be condemned to suffer
"grievous loss."
86 408 U.S. at 485-88. In determining what mini-
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against the parolee, the opportunity to be
heard in person and to present witnesses and
documentary evidence before a neutral and
detached hearing body, the right to confront
and cross-examine adverse witnesses (absent
the hearing officer's specific finding of good
cause for not allowing confrontation), and the
requirement of a written statement of evidence
relied on and reasons for the revocation."'
Atwood is one of numerous cases in the after-
math of Morrissey in which courts have grappled
with the precise scope and meaning of this due
process requirement in varying fact situations
involving parole revocations .8 Parolee At-
mum safeguards would satisfy due process requir-
ments in parole revocations, the Court was unwilling
to consider a revocation hearing as an integral part
of a criminal prosecution and therefore subject to
the full panoply of rights guaranteed a defendant in
a criminal proceeding. The Court made it clear that
it did not intend unreasonably to burden state parole
systems with an inflexible, formalized parole revoca-
tion process.
"T The Court left open the question of the parolee's
right to retain counsel. In his concurrence, Justice
Brennan joined by Justice Marshall, stated that Gold-
berg had already determined that those suffering
grievous loss must be allowed to retain counsel.
Therefore, he asserted, the only unresolved issue
was whether the indigent parolee had a right to
court-provided counsel. 408 U.S. at 491. Justice
Douglas would have provided the parolee with an
unconditional right to confront and cross-examine
adverse witnesses. Id. at 499 (Douglas, J., dissenting
in part).
8 See, e.g., Carson v. Taylor, 19 CRIi. L. REP.
(BNA) 2403 (2d Cir. July 22, 1976); Baker v. Wain-
wright, 527 F.2d 372 (5th Cir. 1976); Preston v.
Piggman, 496 F.2d 270 (6th Cir. 1974); United States
ex rel. Dereczynski v. Longo, 368 F. Supp. 682 (N.D.
Ill. 1973), affd, 506 F.2d 1403 (7th Cir. 1974). Addi-
tonally, courts have applied Morrissey requirements
to other classes of individuals within the penal system
at various stages of administrative adjudication. (1)
Probation revocation: Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S.
778 (1973) (qualified right to counsel); (2) Search and
seizure of probationers: United States v. Consuelo-
Gonzales, 521 F.2d 259 (9th Cir. 1975) (supervision
over probationer allowed only to the extent necessary
for reformation and rehabilitation); Latta v. Fitzhar-
ris, 521 F.2d 246 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 897
(1975) (blanket search conditions invalid); Tamez v.
State, 534 S.W.2d 686 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976) (exclu-
sionary rule applicable to probation revocation hear-
ing); (3) In-prison disciplinary hearings: Enomoto v.
Clutchette, 44 U.S.L.W. 4487 (April 20, 1976); Wolff
v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974); Kirby v. Black-
ledge, 530 F.2d 583 (4th Cir. 1976); Lokey v. Richard-
son, 527 F.2d 949 (9th Cir. 1975),vacated, 44 U.S.L.W.
3748 (June 28, 1976); Willis v. Ciccone, 506 F.2d 1011
(8th Cir. 1974); United States ex rel. Miller v.
wood's case reached the court of appeals fol-
lowing the district court's denial of his petition
for a writ of habeas corpus. Atwood's parole
had been revoked and he had been returned
to prison after his parole officer filed a violation
of parole report. The violation consisted of a
conviction for drunk driving and the alleged
possession of a gun and consumption of alco-
holic beverages while on parole. The parole
authority denied Atwood's request for a pre-
liminary revocation hearing and returned him
to jail. A final revocation hearing was held, but
Atwood was not allowed to present his own
witnesses or cross-examine adverse witnesses.
The parole board revoked his parole, basing
its decision principally on his misdemeanor
conviction.
The Atwood majority held that the require-
ment of a preliminary revocation hearing is
not automatically eliminated by a subsequent
conviction. The Morrissey decision made clear
that the purpose of a preliminary revocation
hearing is to determine probable cause that a
parole violation has been committed, but the
need for such a hearing when the alleged
violation is the conviction of a subsequent crime
was qualified by other Morrissey language which
stated that "[o]bviously a parolee cannot reliti-
gate issues determined against him in other
forums."8 9 On the basis of this language, some
courts have concluded that preliminary revo-
cation hearings are not required as of right
when the parole violation is based on a post-
parole conviction. Not all courts agree, how-
ever, on the extent to which parolees may be
deprived of a preliminary hearing when they
have been involved in a post-parole crime.90
The trend seems to be toward requiring some
sort of preliminary hearing.
MeGee v. Warden, U.S. Penitentiary9 seems to
Twomey, 479 F.2d 701 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied sub
nom. Gutierrez v. Department of Public Safety of
Illinois, 414 U.S. 1146 (1974); (4) Prison transfer:
Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215 (1976); Carlo v.
Gunter, 520 F.2d 1293 (1st Cir. 1975).
89 408 U.S. at 490.
"0 This discussion does not deal with the rights of
parolees incarcerated during the period between
arrest and conviction of the post-parole crime. For
cases reaching opposite results on the need for a
preliminary hearing, compare United States v.
Tucker, 524 F.2d 77 (5th Cir. 1975) with United
States ex rel. Dereczynski v. Longo, 368 F. Supp. 682
(N.D. Ill. 1973).
91 395 F. Supp. 181 (M.D. Pa. 1975).
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hold that neither Morrissey nor its progeny
requires a preliminary revocation hearing
where a parolee admits to committing parole
violations. In MeGee a parolee, convicted of
driving-under-the-influence in a state several
hundred miles from the institution from which
he was paroled, had an interview with a federal
probation officer in the state of the driving
conviction before he was returned to the parol-
ing institution for a revocation hearing. At that
interview the parolee was presented with a
Revocation Hearing Election Form which
stated that a parolee is not entitled to a prelim-
inary revocation hearing if he admits he has
violated any condition of his parole or if he has
been convicted of violating a law while on
parole. The parolee's initials appeared on that
form near two statements: "I admit that I
violated one or more of the conditions of my
release" and "I have been convicted of violating
the law while under supervision."9
Although the parolee argued that the form
violated the due process standards of Morrissey,
the court found "no language in Morrissey which
[was] contrary to [the Revocation Hearing Elec-
tion Form] ." 93 However, as if unconvinced of
its own interpretation of Morrissey, the court
rested its decision that no due process violations
had occurred on a determination that the par-
olee's interview with the probation officer con-
stituted a preliminary revocation hearing.94
In contrast, a federal district court in Mary-
land has squarely held that a parolee's subse-
quent conviction does not eliminate the need
for a Mor-issey preliminary hearing. In Younger
v. Shields,95 the court interpreted dictum in an
earlier Fourth Circuit case which said that the
parolee's probable cause hearing after a convic-
tion could be "held elsewhere . .. , usually at
the prison""8 to mean that use of a single
revocation hearing violates due process even in
post-parole conviction cases.97 In light of this
dictum, the court refused to grant the parole
board's motion for summary judgment against
the habeus corpus petition, and it indicated
92 Id. at 183.
9Id. at 184.
94Id.
95 70 F.R.D. 698 (E.D. Va. 1976).96 Id. at 700 (quoting Gaddy v. Michael, 519 F.2d
669, 672-73 n.5 (4th Cir. 1975)).
91 In Younger the parolee had been convicted of
the unauthorized use of an automobile, but the
parole authority waited three months to revoke his
parole in a single revocation hearing.
the need for further facts in order to determine
whether a preliminary hearing had in fact been
granted the parolee.
The California Supreme Court in In re La-
Croix9" interpreted Morrissey to allow a post-
parole misdemeanor trial to serve as a prelimi-
nary revocation hearing. However, the court
recognized that due process requires that the
parolee be made aware of the dual purpose of
the proceedings before the trial court decision
can be dispositive of the parole violation issue. 99
Since considerably more than a misdemeanor
conviction will be at stake, the parolee may
wish to present a stronger defense in the mis-
demeanor trial.
Using the same common sense approach of
the California court, the Ninth Circuit in At-
wood held that the post-parole misdemeanor
trial could serve as a preliminary revocation
hearing if the parolee were made aware of the
proceeding's dual purpose. Thus, the denial of
a preliminary hearing to Atwood would not
have been unconstitutional if he had been given
notice that the trial for the drunk driving
charge was also serving as a preliminary hear-
ing. However, because the district court had
not held an evidentiary hearing, the Ninth
Circuit was unable to determine if Atwood had
been given sufficient notice. In remanding the
issue to determine if the parolee had been
aware of the dual purpose of the trial or if a
lack of such notice was prejudicial, Atwood has
essentially brought the insight of the California
court in In re LaCroix to the United States
Court of Appeals.
In cases where the post-parole conviction
results in incarceration of the parolee, appellate
courts have split on the question of whether a
parole revocation hearing may be delayed until
the parolee has completed serving the sentence
for the subsequent crime. 100 However, in Moody
v. Dagget1 0 1 the Supreme Court recently re-
98 12 Cal. 3d 146, 115 Cal. Rptr. 344, 524 P.2d 816
(1974); 12 Cal. 3d at 151, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 348, 524
P.2d at 820.
99 The initial California Supreme Court case to
require this notice was In re Law, 10 Cal. 3d 21, 109
Cal. Rptr. 573, 513 P.2d 621 (1973), quoted in 12 Cal.
3d at 151, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 348, 524 P.2d at 820. In re
Law dealt with the issue of bail prior to any post-
parole trial or conviction.
100 Compare Jones v. Johnston, 534 F.2d 353 (D.C.
Cir. 1976) (hearing cannot be delayed) with Reese v.
United States Bd. of Parole, 530 F.2d 231 (9th Cir.
1976) (hearing can be delayed).
101 429 U.S. 78 (1976).
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solved this issue. Moody allows a detainer war-
rant to remain unexecuted until sentence com-
pletion,'10 2 and it indicates that incarceration of
a parolee for the conviction of a post-parole
crime eliminates the need for a preliminary
revocation hearing.
In Moody the parolee had been convicted
and sentenced to two concurrent ten year
prison terms for manslaughter and second de-
gree murder. Both offenses had been commit-
ted while he was on parole from a rape convic-
tion. 03 The parolee sought to have the detainer
warrant executed immediately in order that a
parole revocation determination could be made
and the original and post-parole sentences
could be served concurrently. The majority of
the Court held that the issuance of a detainer
warrant did not itself entitle the parolee to an
immediate parole revocation hearing because
the parole authority had the power to remedy
all of the possible problems which the parolee
had raised."' It could, for example, at the
time of the eventual parole revocation hearing
retrospectively decide that the parolee's origi-
nal sentence had run concurrently with the
post-parole sentence.
Since Moody had been convicted of and
incarcerated for subsequent crimes, the Court
stated in a footnote that a Morrissey preliminary
hearing was not required'05 because the subse-
quent conviction "obviously" provided parole
authorities with probable cause of parole viola-
102 When a parolee is incarcerated because of a
post-parole conviction, the authority who granted
the parole may lodge a parole detainer warrant with
the incarcerating institution. This assures that the
parolee will not be released from custody until the
parole authority executes the warrant and makes a
parole revocation determination. In practice, parole
boards have not executed the detainer warrants until
the parolee has completed the sentence for the post-
parole conviction. Parolees, on the other hand, have
sought to have the warrant executed and the parole
revocation determined immediately. Parolees have
alleged that unexecuted warrants subject them to
numerous burdens, including not allowing the origi-
nal and the post-parole sentences to run concur-
rently.
,03 All three crimes were federal offenses because
they were committed on a Government Indian reser-
vation. 18 U.S.C. §1153 (1966).
'01 For a discussion of these hardships, especially
the lack of a speedy disposition, see the dissent by
Justice Stevens. 429 U.S. at 89.
105 d. at 4019 n.7.
tions and the detainer warrant did not imme-
diatley deprive the parolee of liberty. '
This holding by the Court should not affect
cases like Atwood, however. The cases may be
distinguished because first, Atwood was subject
to a possible loss of liberty while Moody, al-
ready in jail, was not. Second, the types of
post-parole crimes committed by Atwood and
Moody were significantly different. Moody's
motivation to defend against charges of man-
slaughter and second degree murder was a
fear of the serious consequences of conviction
and not a fear of parole revocation. Thus, a
preliminary parole revocation hearing would
be superfluous after such conviction, because
the parole board would be entitled to assume
that all of the parolee's favorable evidence had
been presented and considered at the felony
trial.' ' On the other hand, Atwood was
charged with misdemeanor drunk driving. Ab-
sent the parolee's knowledge that the misde-
meanor trial was also serving as a preliminary
revocation hearing, the parole board should
not be able to assume a vigorous defense and
that the conviction is credible evidence of a
parole violation.
In addition to the preliminary hearing issue,
the Atwood decision also focused on the proce-
dure which the parole board followed at the
final revocation hearing. Its treatment, or per-
haps lack of treatment, of the issue of the
presentation of witnesses favorable to Atwood
is the most interesting aspect of this portion of
the decision. 0 8 Morrissey requires that the par-
olee be given the opportunity to present wit-
nesses and documentary evidence'0 9 although,
106 Id.
,07 See Reese v. United States Bd. of Parole, 530
F.2d 231, 234 (9th Cir. 1976).
,08 The Atwood court mentioned two other issues:
the parolee's right to confront and cross-examine
adverse witnesses and the importance of mitigating
circumstances in the parole board's determination of
parole revocation. Its treatment of these issues would
seem to add little to current judicial interpretations.
See generally Baker v. Wainwright, 527 F.2d 372 (5th
Cir. 1976) (remand of revocation of parole decision
because Morrissey standards were violated on the
"totality of the circumstances," including failure of
parole board to specify why the parolee was not
allowed to cross-examine an adverse witness); Preston
v. Piggman, 496 F.2d 270 (6th Cir. 1974) (where
mitigating circumstances are complex, parolee is en-
titled to be represented by counsel).
,09 408 U.S. at 489.
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as the dissent in Atwood pointed out, Morrissey
apparently does not require the state to "pro-
vide for the attendance" of the parolee's own
witnesses.11 0
Prior to the final revocation hearing, Atwood
requested the presence of three named wit-
nesses on his behalf and two adverse witnesses.
None of these witnesses appeared at the hear-
ing, and the court of appeals noted that the
"cryptic" entries of the parole board provided
no reasons for their nonappearance. The court
refused to dismiss these deficiencies as harmless
error "because we cannot say on this record
that the presentation and confrontation of the
witnesses would not have persuaded the panel
[of Atwood's innocence of the gun possession
charge]." '
While the court may have simply been an-
gered at the parole board's "cryptic record,"
the dissent read the court's opinion to require
that the state provide for the attendance of the
requested witnesses. 112 This reading signifi-
cantly expands the rights of parolees at the
final revocation hearing.
Acceptance of this interpretation implies that
the parole board has the powers of compulsory
process. However, compulsory process is guar-
anteed by the sixth amendment only for crimi-
nal trials,1 13 and many states have not provided
parole authorities with subpoena power to com-
pel attendance of any witnesses at revocation
hearings. 1 4 Nonetheless, at least one court has
held in a sixth amendment context that lack of
statutory authority is not necessarily determi-
native. Rhodes v. Wainwright 15 held that the
state parole commission 'should provide the
indigent parolee with counsel, even though the
state argued that the commission had no au-
thority to do so.116 Similarly, the court in
110 19 CRIM. L. REP. at 2244 (Kilkenny, J., dissent-
ing).
"I Id.
"12 The dissent attempted to remind the majority
that nothing in Morrissey "requires the prison authori-
ties to provide for the attendance of the appellant's
own witnesses." Id. (Kilkenny, J., dissenting) (empha-
sis in original).
1'3 U.S. CONST. amend. VI. See generally Friendly,
Some Kind of Hearing, 123 U. PA. L. REv. 1267, 1282
n.81. (1975).
114 See Cassou, The Morrissey Maelstrop: Recent Devel-
opments in California Parole and Probation Revocations,
9 U.S.F.L. REv. 43, 75 (1975).
111 378 F. Supp. 329 (M.D. Fla. 1974).
116 Noting that Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778
O'Brien v. Henderson117 ordered the parole
board to assist the parolee in obtaining the
testimony of witnesses who would oppose the
revocation. The court directed the parole
board, if it lacked sufficient authority to secure
such testimony, to assist the parolee in request-
ing the United States District Court to issue a
subpoena pursuant to Rule 45 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure.
While the Atwood majority's failure to men-
tion the issue of the subpoena power of the
parole board makes the expansive inference
drawn by the dissent difficult to accept, it seems
apparent that, at the very least, the majority
has added a new due process requirement
which obligates parole authorities to provide
specific reasons for the denial of a parolee's
request for the attendance of favorable wit-
nesses. Morrissey requires specific reasons for
refusing to allow parolees to confront adverse
witnesses, but it provides no such protection
for the parolee who is denied the opportunity
to present a favorable witness.118 Thus, in find-
ing that Atwood's hearing "did not meet the
Morrissey standards as to the presentation and
confrontation of witnesses""' because the record
did not indicate excuses for these deficiencies,
the Ninth Circuit implied that the parole au-
thority must issue a statement of good cause
for the denial of the parolee's request to pres-
entfavorable witnesses. Requiring parole boards
to state why any requested witness is not al-
lowed to appear seems entirely reasonable and
in keeping with the philosophy of Morrissey.
Such a requirement provides additional proce-
dural safeguards for the parolee who will suffer
a "grievous loss" if his parole is revoked, yet it
does not place any great burden on the parole
systems.
Since Morrissey v. Brewer,120 commentators
have predicted an increased recognition of par-
(1973), did not hold that it was constitutionally imper-
ative that states provide counsel for indigents in all
probation/parole cases, the court still held that the
fact that the state commission may have neither the
authority nor the funds to provide counsel for the
indigent parolee was a legally insufficient reason for
refusing to appoint counsel for the parolee, "for, if
that were the case Gagnon would be rendered nuga-
tory." Id. at 333.
117 371 F. Supp. 889 (N.D. Ga. 1974).
118 408 U.S. at 489.
119 19 CrIM. L. REP. at 2484 (emphasis added).
120 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
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olee and prisoner due process rights.' Al-
though the Supreme Court's recent decision in
Moody v. Daggett12 2 may have signaled a reem-
phasis by the Court of the discretion which
parole authorities may constitutionally exercise,
that case dealt with incarcerated parolees and
should have no application to cases like Atwood.
In cases which involve parolee misdemeanor
convictions, the Atwood case clarifies the nature
of the preliminary hearing requirement for
parole revocations. It also possibly expands the
due process rights of parolees during the final
revocation hearing. However, the court was
not explicit in its reasoning and it is difficult to
define the intended scope of its decision.1 23 In
an area of the law that is undergoing dramatic
change, such vagueness is extremely unfortun-
ate.
PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES
The United States Supreme Court recog-
nized in 1879 the right of blacks to participate
equally with whites, as jurors, in the adminis-
tration of the law .124 Under the existing federal
jury selection statutes,1 25 however, there are
three points in the selection process at which
this right may be infringed . 126 First of all, voter
121 Cohen, A Comment on Morrissey v. Brewer; Due
Process and Parole Revocation, 8 CRIM. L. BULL. 616
(1972); Fisher, Parole & Probation Revocation Procedures
After Morrissey and Gagnon, 65 J. CRIM. L. & C. 46
(1974); Loewenstein, Bringing the Rule of Law to Parole,
8 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 769 (1975); Loewenstein,
Accelerating Change in Correctional Law: The Impact of
Morrissey, 7 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 528 (1974); Tobri-
ner & Cohen, How Much Process is "Due"?, 25 HAST-
INGs LJ. 801 (1974); Note, Due Process for Parolees
and Probationers, 25 HASTINGs LJ. 602 (1974); Note,
Procedural Due Process in Parole Release Proceedings-
Existing Rules, Recent Court Decisions, and Experience in
the Prison, 60 MINN. L. REV. 341 (1976).
122 429 U.S. 78 (1976).
13 The issue has not been raised in many cases,
because, as one commentator found, most states
allow parolees to present their own witnesses. Low-
enstein, Accelerating Change in Correctional Law: The
Impact of Morrissey, 7 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 528, 531
(1974).
124 Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1879).
The fourteenth amendment gives every citizen the
right to a trial of an indictment against him by a jury
selected and impanelled without discrimination
against his race or color. A black defendant in the
case challenged a state law which provided that "all
white male persons ... shall be liable to serve as
jurors .... ." The Supreme Court held that the
statute violated the equal protection clause. Id. at 310.
125 28 U.S.C. §§1861-70 (1976).
126 Potash, Mandatory Inclusion of Racial Minorities
On Jury Panels, 3 BLACK L.J. 80 (1973).
registration lists or lists of actual voters are
required to be used as the basic source of juror
names."2 It has been held that constitutional
standards are not violated by such use of voter
lists on which blacks are underrepresented, so
long as names for jury duty are drawn through
random selection based on objective criteria.1 28
Secondly, the criteria for screening the initial
list," 29 although intended by Congress to pro-
127 28 U.S.C. § 1863(2) (1976) provides that a written
plan for random selection of grand and petit jurors
shall "specify whether the names of prospective ju-
rors shall be selected from the voter registration lists
or the lists of actual voters of the political subdivisions
within the district or division."
125 United States v. Briggs, 366 F. Supp. 1356
(N.D. Fla. 1973).
129 28 U.S.C. § 1865 (1976) which deals with the
qualifications for jury service, provides that:
(a) The chief judge of the district court, or such
other district court judge as the plan may pro-
vide, on his initiative or upon recommendation
of the clerk or jury commission, shall determine
solely on the basis of information provided on
the juror qualification form and other compe-
tent evidence whether a person is unqualified
for, or exempt, or to be excused from jury
service. The clerk shall enter such determina-
tion in the space provided on the juror qualifi-
cation form and the alphabetical list of names
drawn from the master jury wheel. If a person
did not appear in response to a summons, such
fact shall be noted on said list.
(b) In making such determination the chief
judge of the district court or such other district
court judge as the plan may provide, shall deem
any person qualified to serve on grand and
petit juries in the district court unless he-
(1) is not a citizen of the United States
eighteen years old who has resided for a
period of one year within the judicial dis-
trict;
(2) is unable to read, write, and understand
the English language with a degree of pro-
ficiency sufficient to fill out satisfactorily
the juror qualification form;
(3) is unable to speak the English language;
(4) is incapable, by reason of mental or
physical infirmity, to render satisfactory
jury service; or
(5) has a charge pending against him for
the commission of, or has been convicted
in a State or Federal court of record of, a
crime punishable by imprisonment for
more than one year and his civil rights
have not been restored by pardon or am-
nesty.
28 U.S.C. §1866 (1976), which establishes the proce-
dure for selection and summoning of jury panels,
provides that:
(c) Except as provided in section 1865 of this
title or in any jury selection plan provision
adopted pursuant to paragraph (5), (6) or (7) of
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vide objectivity,3 0 may be abused. The third
opportunity to exclude blacks from juries is
the peremptory challenge.' 3' Peremptory chal-
lenges are, by definition, exercised without a
reason stated, without inquiry and without
being subject to the court's control. 3 2 Allega-
tions of racially discriminatory use of peremp-
tory challenges have been recently considered
by the courts.
In Swain v. Alabama, 33 the Supreme Court
considered the claim of a black person relating
to the exercise of peremptory challenges to
exclude blacks from serving on petit juries.13 4
section 1863(b) of this title, no person or class of
persons shall be disqualified, excluded, excused,
or exempt from service as jurors: Provided, That
any person summoned for jury service may be
(1) excused by the court, upon a showing of
undue hardship or extreme inconvenience, for
such period as the court deems necessary, at
the conclusion of which such person shall be
summoned ag-in for jury service under subsec-
tions (b) and (c) of this section, or (2) excluded
by the court on the ground that such person
may be unable to render impartial jury service
or that his service as a juror would be likely to
disrupt the proceedings, or (3) excluded upon
peremptory challenge as provided by law, or (4)
excluded pursuant to the procedure specified
by law upon a challenge by any party for good
cause shown, or (5) excluded upon determina-
tion by the court that his service as a juror
would be likely to threaten the secrecy of the
proceedings, or otherwise adversely affect the
integrity ofjury deliberations.
130 [1968] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 1792, 1803:
[S]ection 1865(a) makes clear that for disqualifi-
cations, as is true for exemptions and excuses,
subjective tests are prohibited. Thus, the dis-
qualification criteria of section 1865(a) are pur-
posely criteria that are capable of objective dem-
onstration, in the sense that they are subject to
proof by facts without any substantial possibility
of distortion or interpretation of those facts by
personal feelings or prejudices.
131 28 U.S.C. §1870 (1976) establishes that:
In civil cases, each party shall be entitled to
three peremptory challenges. Several defend-
ants or several plaintiffs may be considered as a
single party for the purposes of making chal-
lenges, or the court may allow additional per-
emptory challenges and permit them to be ex-
ercised separately or jointly.
All challenges for cause or favor, whether to
the array or panel or to individual jurors, shall
be determined by the court.
133 Lewis v. United States, 146 U.S. 370,378 (1892).
133 380 U.S. 202 (1965).
'3 The applicable jury selection statute in Swain
was ALA. CODE, Tit. 30, §§54, 60-64 (1958). In Ala-
bama counties, petit jury venires of approximately
35 are drawn for criminal cases unless a capital
In that case, the six blacks available for jury
service were excluded by the prosecutor during
the jury selection process.13 s The Supreme
Court declined to hold that the "striking of
Negroes in a particular case is a denial of equal
protection of the laws," 13 r6 or that "the Consti-
tution requires an examination of the prosecu-
tor's reasons for the exercise of his challenges
in any given case."1 3 7 Instead, there is a "pre-
sumption in any particular case . . . that the
prosecutor is using the State's challenges to
obtain a fair and impartial jury to try the case
before the court. 13 8 The Court did nonetheless
recognize that a different issue was raised by
the claim that in criminal cases prosecutors in
that particular county had consistently and sys-
tematically exercised their strikes to prevent all
blacks from serving on the petitjury.13 9 Accord-
ing to the Court:
If the State has not seen fit to leave a single
Negro on any jury in a criminal case, the pre-
sumption protecting the prosecutor may well be
overcome. Such proof might support a reasona-
ble inference that Negroes are excluded from
juries for reasons wholly unrelated to the out-
come of the particular case on trial and that the
peremptory system is being used to deny the
Negro the same right and opportunity to partic-
ipate in the administration of justice enjoyed by
the white population. These ends the peremp-
tory challenge is not designed to facilitate or
justify.1 40
The Court found the record in Swain to be
insufficient to establish a violation of the four-
teenth amendment,14 1 but it suggested that a
record which showed the "prosecutor's sys-
tematic use of peremptory challenges against
Negroes over a period of time" ' would estab-
lish a valid fourteenth amendment claim.
offense was involved, in which case 100 are drawn.
After excuses and removals for cause, the venire is
reduced to about 75. The jury is then "struck"-the
defense challenging two veniremen and the prosecu-
tion one in alternating turns, until only 12 jurors
remain. This system is also available in civil cases.
380 U.S. at 210.
135 Id.
136 Id. at 221 (emphasis added).13
7 Id. at 222 (emphasis added).
138 Id. (emphasis added).
139 Id. at 223.140 Id. at 223-24 (citation omitted).
4 1 Id. at 223.
142 Id. at 227. With regard to the record in Swain,
the Court stated:
The difficulty with the record before us, per-
19771
Recently, a United States District Court in
Connecticut held in United States v. Robinson
14 3
that the defendants had established that blacks
were being denied the right to participate
equally with whites as jurors in criminal trials.
Although there had been warnings in the past
by other federal courts,'4 this case was the
first which afforded defendants 45 relief for
haps flowing from the fact that it was made in
connection with the motion to quash the indict-
ment, is that it does not with any acceptable
degree of clarity, show when, how often, and
under what circumstances the prosecutor alone
has been responsible for striking those Negroes
who have appeared on petit jury panels ....
Id. at 224.
,43 421 F. Supp. 467 (D. Conn. 1976).
144 In United States v. Pearson, 448 F.2d 1207 (5th
Cir. 1971), the court held that evidence of the prose-
cutor's conduct with regard to peremptory challenges
made in trials held the week before the trial involved
here, was insufficient to overcome the presumption
that the prosecutor had discharged his duties in a
constitutional manner. The court said however, that
the "courts should be liberal in holding that defend-
ants have established the claim of systematic exclusion
prima facie if Swain's approach to the problem is to be
workable. The burden of proof faced by defendants
is most difficult .... Nonetheless, the burden is not
insurmountable." Id. at 1217-18 (footnote omitted).
In United States v. Carter, 528 F.2d 844 (8th Cir.
1975), the defendant presented evidence that in the
fifteen cases involving black defendants during this
particular year the Government had excluded 8.1%
of blacks potentially available to serve on petit jury
trial and in 47% of those cases the Government had
used its peremptory challenges to remove all black
jurors. The court found that a prima facie case had
not been presented, but characterized the challenges
to the prosecutor's practices in that district as raising
a "serious question," and emphasized that the burden
of proof of defendant was "not insurmountable." Id.
at 850.
In United States v. Nelson, 529 F.2d 40 (8th Cir.
1976), the court took judicial notice of the statistical
evidence presented in Carter. The court found the
Carter decision dispositive, but added that the statis-
tics caused them to "view with concern the allegations
made here and in Carter." Moreover, the district
judges were advised to scruitinize the prosecutors'
practices and to use their discretionary power to
ensure that "no potential juror is denied the privilege
of serving upon ajury solely because of his race .
Id. at 43 (citation omitted).
See Finkelstein, The Application of Statistical Decision
Theory to the Jury Discrimination Cases, 80 HARV. L.
REV. 338 (1966). Finkelstein uses mathematical anal-
ysis to show the extreme improbability that nondiscri-
minatory selection occurred in situations (including
Swain v. Alabama) in which courts have been unwilling
to find a violation of the fourteenth amendment.
145 One of the defendants in this case was black.
the prosecutor's misuse of peremptory chal-
lenges against black veniremen. The prosecu-
tor in Robinson had struck all four of the blacks
eligible for the final selection.
1 46
To the extent the right sought to be pro-
tected is that of black citizens to participate
equally in the jury process, a question of stand-
ing arises when the right is asserted by a crimi-
nal defendant rather than by an excluded ju-
ror. The court in Robinson noted the problem
of standing,' 47 but it decided that Barrow v.
Jackson'48 applied in this situation to give stand-
ing to defendants to assert the rights of third
persons. The Robinson court also cited Peters v.
Kiff,149 a case in which the Supreme Court held
that, whatever his race, a criminal defendant
has standing to challenge the system used to
select his grand or petit jury on the ground
that it arbitrarily excludes from service the
members of any race and thereby denies him
due process of law.
The jury selection system used in the Con-
necticut district is the "struck" jury system:
after challenges have been allowed for cause,
the clerk draws from the jury wheel a number
of names equal to the jury of twelve plus
alternates plus the number of peremptory chal-
lenges alloted to the prosecution and defense;
names not challenged are replaced in the jury
wheel for a final drawing of jurors.'50 In find-
1
46 Id. at 469.
'
47 Id. at 470.
148 346 U.S. 249, 257 (1953). In that case plaintiffs
(white) sued defendant (white) for damages for
breach of a racially restrictive covenant the parties
had entered into as owners of real estate in the same
neighborhood. There was a question regarding
whether the white defendant could raise the rights
of blacks in his defense. The Court stated:
[I]n the instant case, we are faced with a unique
situation in which it is the action of the state
court which might result in a denial of constitu-
tional rights and in which it would be difficult if
not impossible for the persons whose rights are
asserted to present their grievance before any
court. Under the peculiar circumstances of this
case, we believe the reasons which underlie our
rule denying standing to raise another's rights,
which is only a rule of practice, are outweighed
by the need to protect the fundamental rights
which would be denied by permitting the dam-
ages action to be maintained.
Id. at 257 (citation omitted).
149 407 U.S. 493, 504 (1972).
50 The first twelve names drawn become the jury,
and the remainder become alternates in the order




ing that the defendants had satisfied their bur-
den of proving systematic exclusion of blacks
for a two-year period, the court focused on the
"exclusion rate," defined as the percentage of
blacks in the final panel who had been peremp-
torily challenged by the prosecutors, 151 here
69.5%.
The data show that 82 Negroes have been in-
cluded in the final group eligible for jury selec-
tion, and that the prosecutors have exercised
their peremptory challenges to strike 57 of these,
or an exclusion rate of 69.5%. In cases involving
White defendants, 49 Negroes were in the final
group, and the prosecutors challenged 29, for
an exclusion rate of 59.2%. In cases involving
Black or Hispanic defendants, 33 Negroes were
in the final group, and the prosecutors chal-
lenged 28, for an exclusion rate of 84.8%. Of
the 72 trials analyzed, Blacks were seated as
jurors in only 13 instances, or 18.1%, and in 10
of these, only one Black juror was seated.1 2
The court also considered the disparity be-
tween the actual and the expected rates for
blacks sitting on juries:
It is equally disturbing that in only 18.5% of
criminal trials were Blacks, normally just one,
seated as jurors or alternates. As a matter of
statistical probability, if twelve jurors and two
alternates were selected from a universe that
included 5% Blacks (the adult Black percentage
in Connecticut), at least one Black would be
included in the 14 jurors selected approximately
50% of the time ....
The disparity between the 50% expectation and
the 18.5% actuality is the context in which the
present claim of excessive use of peremptory
challenges against Blacks should be considered. *i
The relief fashioned by the Robinson court
included an order disallowing the challenge of
the four black veniremen and resuming the
jury selection process with those four names
included. Thus the names would be placed
again in the jury wheel for the final drawing.
The first twelve names drawn would constitute
the jury, and, if all challenges have been exer-
cised, the remainder would be alternates in the
order drawn. 54 For the future, the court also
151 Id.
152 Id.
15 Id. at 472.
'15 Id. at 474.
ordered the United States Attorney's Office
"to maintain a record for each criminal trial of
the number of Blacks included in the final
panels against which peremptory challenges
are exercised and the number of Blacks chal-
lenged peremptorily by the prosecutor without
explanation:' 55
It is not the purpose of this ruling to require the
government to place on the record its reasons
for exercising any peremptory challenge. The
caveat "without explanation" is added simply to
insure that the government is always free, if it so
desires, to place on the record any non-racial
reason it may have for challenging a Black ven-
ireman, in which event such challenges, ade-
quately explained, will not be counted in deter-
mining the ensuing pattern of Black peremptory
challenges. 56
In addition, records were ordered to be kept
"of the number of all criminal trials, the num-
ber of such trials in which at least one black
was included in the final panel, and the number
of such trials in which at least one black was
empaneled as a juror or alternate.' 5 7 A sum-
mary report of these records must be furnished
to the court, along with copies to the Federal
Public Defenders in Connecticut.
158
Robinson demonstrates that a federal court
will grant relief to a defendant who can prove,
as suggested in Swain v. Alabama, that blacks
have systematically been denied their right to
participate in the jury system. There are two
possible methods of circumventing this deci-
sion, however. First, a prosecutor can allow a
"token" black to sit on the jury, although this
practice was condemned by the United States
Supreme Court."59 The other alternative is for
1"' Id. (emphasis added).
156Id. The court warned that if the pattern were
to continue at an excessive rate, peremptory chal-
lenges of blacks may be disallowed in cases arising
after such a pattern has been shown to have contin-




" In Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1953), the
Supreme Court held that petitioner, a black, was not
denied due process or equal protection in violation
of the fourteenth amendment by the method of
selecting grand and petit juries from lists limited by
state statute to taxpayers, although the lists had a
higher proportion of white than black citizens. The
Court, relying upon Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128
(1940), noted that "token summoning of Negroes for
jury service does not comply with equal protection."
344 U.S. at 471.
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the prosecutor to state reasons, however true,
for challenging blacks. This latter procedure
contradicts the very definition of peremptory
challenges; namely, that they are exercised
without a reason stated, without inquiry and
without being subject to the court's control.1 60
It may be that peremptory challenges will be
reevaluated in the face of this dilemma.
SURGICAL SEARCHES AND SEIZURES
Accused persons can be constitutionally com-
pelled to submit to a surgical operation by the
State in search of evidence of a crime according
to a recent decision by the District of Columbia
Court of Appeals in United States v. Crowder."
The court, sitting en banc, 61 in a case of first
impression in the federal courts, held that the
petitioner's fourth amendment rights were not
violated when the trial court ordered the sur-
gical removal of a bullet from his forearm.
The majority rejected the argument that a non-
consensual surgical operation constituted an
unreasonable intrusion into the body in viola-
tion of the fourth amendment. 63
In December, 1970, Dr. James Bowman, a
dentist, was murdered while working in his
office. Death was caused by a gunshot wound
in the heart. One .32 caliber slug was recovered
from his body, and another was found in his
underwear. Across the street the police found
what later proved to be the murder weapon, a
.32 caliber Smith & Wesson revolver, contain-
ing four expended rounds and two live rounds.
The police established that the gun had been
kept in the doctor's office and was registered
in his wife's name.
Less than a week later the police arrested
one Sandra Toomer and charged her with the
,1 Lewis v. United States, 146 U.S. 370,378 (1892).
1 1 543 F.2d 312 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
162 The majority opinion was written by Judge
Robb, with Judges McGowan, Tamm, MacKinnon
and Wilkey concurring. Judge McGowan filed a
separate, concurring opinion. The dissenting opinion
by Judge Robinson was joined by Chief Judge Baze-
lon and Judge Wright. Judge Leventhal filed a sepa-
rate, dissenting opinion.
163 U.S. CONST. amend. IV provides: "The right
of people to be secure in theirpersons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and sei-
zures, shall not be violated .... (emphasis added).
The fourth amendment was held applicable to the
states through the due process clause of the four-
teenth amendment in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643
(1961), rev'g Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
murder. She in turn implicated Crowder. She
confessed to the police that she and Crowder
confronted the doctor with a toy pistol, a scuffle
began, and she ran. A few moments later she
heard gun shots. Upon rejoining her, Crowder
told her that he had been shot in the arm and
leg, but he thought that he had killed the
doctor.
Acting on this information the police ar-
rested Crowder. Observing that his right wrist
and left arm were bandaged, they took him to
D.C. General Hospital for x-rays. The x-rays
disclosed metallic foreign bodies in both Crow-
der's right forearm and left leg which appeared
to resemble .32 caliber bullets.
In February, 1971, an application for an
order authorizing the surgical removal of the
bullet from Crowder's arm was presented to
the U.S. District Court for the District of Co-
lumbia. The application was supported by an
affidavit narrating the facts set out above and,
in addition, a medical affidavit was attached.
The medical affidavit stated that the surgical
removal of the bullet from Crowder's arm
would not involve any harm or risk of injury,
but that the removal of the bullet from Crow-
der's leg was medically inadvisable. 16
A hearing on the proposed order was then
held and the judge found, in accordance with
uncontradicted medical testimony by the State,
that the surgical removal of the bullet from
Crowder's arm would not involve any harm or
risk of injury to life or limb. On the basis
of this finding, and citing Schmerber v. Califor-
nia, 6 the judge ordered the requested surgical
operation to be performed according to certain
prescribed medical procedures.1 66 In April,
161 543 F.2d at 313.
16 384 U.S. 757 (1966). In Schmerber the defendant
was injured in a car accident and taken to a hospital
for treatment. While Schmerber was receiving treat-
ment at the hospital the police arrested him for
driving while intoxicated. Then at the direction of a
police officer, a blood sample was involuntarily with-
drawn from Schmerber's body without his consent
by a hospital physician. The Supreme Court held
that the involuntary blood sample removal was a
reasonable search incident to a lawful arrest. Id. at
772. The Schmerber decision thus established that
searches involving state intrusions beneath the sur-
face of a person's skin did not constitute a per se
violation of the fourth amendment.
166 543 F.2d at 314. The judge ordered:
1. That the Superintendent of the District of
Columbia General Hospital, or his authorized
representative or representatives, shall remove
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1971, the bullet was successfully removed at
D.C. General Hospital. 16
Crowder argued on appeal that a non-con-
sensual surgical operation by the State violated
his fourth amendment right to be free from
"unreasonable" searches and seizures. The ar-
gument was based upon the premise that a
surgical operation into the human body in
search of evidence of a crime went beyond the
scope of intrusions constitutionally permissible
under the fourth amendment.6's
In its majority opinion, the court in Crowder
initially relied upon the fourth amendment
reasonableness standard laid down by the Su-
from the right forearm of James L. Crowder
the foreign matter disclosed by x-rays and posi-
tively believed to be a .32 caliber slug;
2. That such removal is to be done at the
District of Columbia General Hospital with ac-
cepted medical procedures, with due regard
given to the health and preservation of the life
of James L. Crowder;
3. That if at any time during the course of
the removal procedures danger to the life of
James L. Crowder develops, such removal pro-
cedures shall cease and such other steps as may
be pecessary shall be taken to protect the health
and life of James L. Crowder; and
4. That after removal of the foreign matter,
such matter shall be turned over to an author-
ized representative of the Metropolitan Police
Department, who is to make a return to the
Court in accordance with requirements of Rule
41 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.
5. The defendant shall not tamper with or
disturb the wound in his right forearm, or
remove, destroy or dispose of the bullet lodged
therein.
Id.
'16 Id. At the trial a firearms identification expert
testified that the bullet found in Crowder's forearm
and the two bullets recovered from Dr. Bowman's
person were all fired from the Bowman Pistol. Id. at
315-16. Crowder was subsequently convicted on all
three counts of second degree murder, robbery and
carrying a dangerous weapon. Id. at 312-13.
c18 Id. at 313. The fourth amendment protects only
against unreasonable searches and seizures. Ker v.
California, 374 U.S. 23, 33 (1963); Elkins v. United
States, 364 U.S. 206, 222 (1960); Carroll v. United
States, 267 U.S. 132, 147 (1925). The relevant test is
not whether it was reasonable to procure a search
warrant, but whether the search was reasonable.
Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58, 62 (1967); United
States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 66 (1950). The
Supreme Court has recognized that there is no for-
mula for the determination of reasonableness. Each
case is to be decided on its own facts and circum-
stances. United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 63
(1950); Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282
U.S. 344, 357 (1931).
preme Court in Schmerber v. California which
was used to support the argument that an
unconsented-to needle puncture by the State
was constitutional:
[T]he fourth amendment's proper function is to
constrain not against all intrusions as such, but
against intrusions which are not justified in the
circumstances or which are made in an improper
manner.
169
In attempting to apply this standard, however,
the court declared four additional factors which
led it to the conclusion that the surgical opera-
tion was reasonable and justified in the facts
and circumstances of this case .
1 70
In contrast, courts which have faced the
constitutional issue of a surgical search and
seizure prior to Crowder have relied on a differ-
ent standard of reasonableness implicit in the
Schmerber decision.' The effect of these deci-
sions has been to sanction a surgical operation
on the body of an accused person if the opera-
tion was characterized as a "minor intrusion"
and to prohibit a surgical operation if the
operation was characterized as a "major intru-
sion."
Prior to Crowder, the severity of the operation
and the attendant risks of harm to life or limb
have been the sole determining factors of
whether a surgical operation is a minor or
major intrusion and therefore whether it is
constitutional. In 1972, in Creamer v. State,'
the Supreme Court of Georgia became the first
state court to affirm a non-consensual, surgical
1
6 9 Id. at 316 (quoting 384 U.S. at 768). In Schmerber
the Supreme Court applied this standard by making
two inquires: (1) Whether the police were justified in
requiring the petitioner to submit to the blood test,
and (2) whether the means and procedures employed
in taking the blood respected relevant fourth amend-
ment standards of reasonableness. 384 U.S. at 768.
170 543 F.2d at 316. See notes 185-90 and accompa-
nying text infra.
171 In Schmerber the Supreme Court stated:
That we today hold that the Constitution does
not forbid the States [sic] minor intrusions into an
individual's body under stringently limited con-
ditions in no way indicates that it permits more
substantial intrusions, or intrusions under other
conditions.
384 U.S. at 772 (emphasis added). The Schmerber
court noted elsewhere in the opinion that "[b]ecause
we are dealing with intrusions into the human body
rather than with state interferences with property
relationships or private papers ... we write on a
clean slate." Id. at 767-68.
172 229 Ga. 511, 192 S.E.2d 350 (1972), cert. denied,
410 U.S. 975 (1973).
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operation by the State to remove a bullet from
an accused person. At a hearing on the pro-
posed surgical operation, a medical physician
testified that the bullet could be removed in
fifteen minutes, using a local anesthetic, and
there would be no risk to the defendant in
removing the bullet. Based upon this uncon-
tradicted medical evidence, the Georgia Su-
preme Court held that the surgical operation
fell within the scope of the Schmerber minor
intrusion standard and was therefore constitu-
tional. 173 A year later in Allison v. State174 a
lower Georgia court, applying the Creamer rule,
held that the surgical removal of a bullet super-
ficially lodged in the defendant's right side did
not violate his fourth amendment rights be-
cause there was uncontradicted evidence by a
medical doctor that the bullet could be surgi-
cally removed without danger to life or limb.'75
Yet in Bowden v. State,'76 the Arkansas Su-
preme Court, when faced with a far more
serious operation than the Georgia courts had
encountered, stayed the execution of a search
warrant order for a surgical operation. In Bow-
den the bullet was lodged in the petitioner's
spinal canal and the surgical operation would
require general anesthesia. At an evidentiary
hearing on the proposed operation, two doc-
tors testified that the surgical removal of the
bullet could cause a worsening of the peti-
tioner's condition including a possible risk of
death. Both doctors described the operation as
a "major intrusion" into the human body. 177
The Bowden court therefore held that the pro-
posed operation could not be performed be-
cause it violated the Schmerber minor intrusion
standard 178
In People v. Smith, 179 a New York trial judge
reached the same conclusion as Bowden in deny-
ing an application for a search warrant to
surgically remove a bullet from the defendant's
body. Medical testimony at a hearing on the
proposed operation disclosed a number of se-
vere risks including a possibility of death. The
bullet was lodged deep in the defendant's chest
and the examining physician characterized the
173 /d. at 515, 192 S.E.2d at 353.
1 7 129 Ga. App. 364, 199 S.E.2d 587 (1973), cert.
denied, 414 U.S. 1145 (1974).
175 Id. at 365, 199 S.E.2d at 589.
176 256 Ark. 820, 510 S.W.2d 879 (1974).
177 Id. at 824, 510 S.W.2d at 881.
1 78 Id.
1. 80 Misc. 2d 210, 362 N.Y.S.2d 909 (Sup. Ct.
1974).
operation as major surgery. Based on this evi-
dence, the trial judge held that the proposed
operation would constitute a major intrusion
into the body of the defendant that would
involve trauma and pain and a possible risk of
life and was therefore beyond the minor intru-
sion standard set down in Schmerber. °80
Only the Supreme Court of Indiana in Adams
v. State""' has held that any surgical operation,
regardless of its severity or the danger it pre-
sents to life or limb, is a per se violation of a
person's fourth amendment rights. The Indi-
ana Supreme Court majority reasoned that any
surgical operation is an "intrusion of the most
serious magnitude" which inherently contrav-
ened the Schmerber minor intrusion stan-
dard.
1 82
Unlike these previous state court decisions,
Crowder did not focus its inquiry solely on the
issue of whether the operation constituted a
minor or major intrusion into the human body.
Instead the court engaged in the broader in-
quiry of whether, in light of all the facts and
circumstances, the surgical operation was rea-
sonable and justified .18 3 Also instead of focus-
ing solely on the severity of the operation and
its attendant risks, the Crowder court identified
four factors, mainly procedural in nature, that
led it to the conclusion that the surgical opera-
tion did not violate the defendant's fourth
amendment rights.
The first factor cited by the court is the
failure of the State to make a prima facie
showing that "the evidence sought was relevant,
could have been obtained in no other way, and
there was probable cause to believe that the
operation would produce it." The court does
not define what it means by the concept of
"relevant." s1 8 4 The weakness of this standard
was the basis of a separate, dissenting opin-
ion. 85
180 Id. at 215, 362 N.Y.S.2d at 914.
181 260 Ind. 663, 299 N.E.2d 834 (1973), cert. denied,
415 U.S. 935 (1974).
'82 260 Ind. at 668, 299 N.E.2d at 837.
18 543 F.2d at 316.
184/Id.
185 Judge Leventhal dissented on the ground that
the prosecution had not made "a strong affirmative
case that the surgical procedure is necessary in order
to prevent a miscarriage of justice." Id. at 318. The
judge noted that the admission in evidence of the
surgically removed bullet only proved that Crowder
was at the scene of the crime, a fact which the State




The second factor is that "the proposed op-
eration was minor, was performed by a skilled
surgeon, and every possible precaution was
taken to guard against any surgical complica-
tions, so that the risk of permanent injury was
minimal.11 6 To this extent, then, it seems that
the Crowder decision is in accord with previous
decisions, even though the Crowder court did
not rely explicitly on the minor intrusion lan-
guage contained in Schmerber. The court de-
fines what it means by minor surgery by way of
illustration to Crowder's surgery:
The bullet, which was small, close to the skin
and easily felt, was extracted by gentle squeezing
after an incision an inch long had been made.
Less than five cc.'s of blood were lost, an amount
smaller than may be taken in a premarital exam-
ination. The entire operation took ten minutes.
In the opinion of the surgeon the risk was
"neglible" and in fact there were no complica-
tions.
18 7
Yet the court imposes a much higher medical
standard on the State than prior decisions have
done. The second factor requires that "every
possible precaution was taken to guard against
any surgical complications," so that "the risk of
permanent injury was minimal."188 This lan-
guage seems to indicate that a surgical opera-
tion by the State can only be imposed upon an
accused person if extraordinary medical pre-
cautions are taken.
The final two factors cited by the court
suggest a set of legal procedures which must
be followed in surgical search and seizure cases.
In order to comply with the fourth amendment
standard of reasonableness, a surgical opera-
tion can only be imposed if "before the opera-
tion the District Court held an adversary hear-
ing at which the defendant appeared with
186 Id.
187 Id.
188 Id. The operation was performed by Dr. Henry
H. Balch who was the Chief Medical Officer in
Surgery at D.C. General Hospital, Director of the
Georgetown University Division at the hospital, and
Special Professor of Surgery at Georgetown Univer-
sity Medical School. Id. at 314.
At a hearing on a motion to suppress the bullet as
evidence, Dr. Balch testified that "maximum precau-
tions" were taken and that "we bent over backwards"
to make sure that Crowder had every protection. Id.
at 315. For example, Dr. Balch testified that Crowder
was kept in a "care ward" for four or five days after
the operation even though a private patient would
have been released immediately. Id.
counsel."'8 9 The fourth factor requires, that
"thereafter and before the operation was per-
formed, the defendant was afforded an oppor-
tunity for appellate review by this court."'8 0
The decision in United States v. Crowder can
be construed to imply that whether a surgical
operation by the State will be constitutionally
reasonable will depend upon strict compliance
with all four factors enunciated by the court.
The court does not state which, if any, factor is
more important, but relies instead on the total
context of the facts and circumstances pre-
sented in the case.' 9 '
Despite the majority holding in United States
v. Crowder that a minor surgical operation
which is performed in accordance with certain
prescribed medical and legal procedures will
not violate a defendant's fourth amendment
rights, Judge Robinson's dissenting opinion
raises a number of issues which remain unre-
solved. First, there is the very debatable ques-
tion whether the United States Supreme Court
would extend its decision in Schmerber v. Califor-
nia to surgical searches and seizures. The crux
of the dissent's opinion in Crowder is that the
Supreme Court would not make such an exten-
sion:
[Ilt seems incontrovertible that, with its marked
intensification of risk, pain, scarring and indign-
ity, a surgical invasion of the body cannot be
189 Id. at 316.
190 Id. After the district court ordered the surgical
removal of the bullet, Crowder was given an oppor-
tunity to file a petition for a writ of prohibition
against the execution of the order in the D.C. Court
of Appeals. The order was denied. Id. at 314.
It should be noted that this is not a case where the
bullet in Crowder's arm would have had to be re-
moved sooner or later for health reasons. In such a
situation, the need for immediate appellate review
would be self evident. Medical testimony established
that the surgical operation on Crowder's arm was
not medically necessary. Id. at 332 n.34 (Robinson,
J., dissenting).
191 Id. at 316. But Judge McGowan filed a separate,
concurring opinion in order "to emphasize the de-
gree to which, in my judgment, the Government's
sensitivity to procedural orderliness and fair play
contributed to the result we reach." Id. at 318. Fur-
thermore, he stated:
This case is something of a sport of its facts,
and frequent recurrence of anything like it is
hardly to be expected. But any future prosecu-
tor confronted with a similiar problem would,
in my view, be well advised to look to the
procedural example set in this case.
Id. at 318 (McGowan, J., concurring).
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likened to the needle puncture which Schmerber
condones, or justified constitutionally by uncriti-
cal comparisons with it.?9
In Schmerber the Supreme Court held that the
blood sample test was a reasonable search pro-
cedure for three reasons: (1) the blood test was
a highly effective means of determining legal
intoxication; (2) such tests were commonplace,
everyday occurrences; and (3) for most people,
the blood test involved virtually no risk, trauma
or pain.19 3 The dissent in Crowder argued that
Schmerber could not be extended to surgical
searches and seizures because a surgical opera-
tion does not comply with these three criteria.
Surgical operations, unlike blood tests are not
indispensable to the detection and deterrance
of a particular type of crime; secondly, surgical
operations, unlike blood tests, are not com-
monplace, everyday occurrences that have be-
come a routine part of everyday life; and
thirdly, surgical operations, unlike blood tests,
involve major risks, trauma and pain. 194 It is
undisputed medical fact that all surgery, no
matter how minor, is accompanied by some
physical pain, some risk of infection and some
chance of an adverse reaction to anesthesia
19" Id. at 322 (Robinson,J., dissenting). The dissent
also cites Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952),
for the proposition that the forcible removal of
evidence from the body by means of a stomach
pump is unconstitutional, and therefore, a surgical
operation to remove evidence is likewise unconstitu-
tional. Id. at 319. This is an inaccurate interpretation
of the Rochin decision.
In Rochin three deputy sheriffs illegally entered
the defendant's home without a search warrant and
forcibly opened the door to his bedroom. Inside
they found Rochin sitting partly dressed on the side
of the bed upon which his wife was also lying. The
deputies jumped upon Rochin but failed to prevent
his swallowing of some capsules. Rochin was then
handcuffed and taken to a hospital where, against
his will, an emetic solution was forced through a
tube into his stomach causing him to regurgitate two
capsules which contained morphine. 342 U.S. at 166.
The Supreme Court held that the entire "course
of proceeding," not the stomach pumping per se,
violated the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment. Both the United States Supreme Court
and other federal circuit courts have interpreted
Rochin as a totality of circumstances case. See Brei-
thaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432, 435 (1957); Blefare v.
United States, 362 F.2d 870, 875-76 (9th Cir. 1966).
See generally, Comment, Constitutionality of Stomach
Searches, 10 U.S.F.L. REV. 93, 107-14 (1975).
19 384 U.S. at 771.
194 543 F.2d at 321-22.
whereas a blood sample test is virtually risk-
free and painless.")5
The Robinson dissent also questions the con-
stitutionality of a non-consensual surgical op-
eration based upon the balancing-of-interests
approach to fourth amendment reasonable-
ness. The Supreme Court has held that in
order to determine whether a search and sei-
zure is constitutionally permissible it is neces-
sary "to focus upon the governmental interest
which alledgedly justifies official intrusion
upon the constitutionally protected interests of
the private citizen," for there is "no ready test
for determining reasonableness other than by
balancing the need to search against the inva-
sion which the search entails."' 96 In Schmerber
the Supreme Court recognized that there was
a compelling state interest in obtaining a blood
sample from the body of an injured driver
because of the urgent need to curb the crime
of driving while intoxicated.197 But in United
States v. Crowder, the dissent argues that there
did not exist a comparable state interest because
the extracted bullet merely proved only that
Crowder was at the scene of the crime and no
overriding state purpose was articulated.
Therefore, the dissent concludes, that even
though the Supreme Court condoned a state
intrusion beneath the surface of a person's skin
in Schmerber, the application of the Schmerber
decision to the facts in Crowder is inapposite
195 Even minor surgery creates a greater risk of
infection than a blood test because a larger opening
must be made in the skin. Moreover, stitches which
are used to close the wound create another source of
infection. In addition, the patient may suffer from
unpredictable reactions from anesthesia. Also the
patient will be left with a permanent scar. See Note,
Surgery and the Search for Evidence, 37 U. Prrr. L.
REv. 429, 436-37 (1975).
196 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968) (quoting
Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 534-35,
536-37 (1967)).
197 384 U.S. at 771. Earlier, in Breithaupt v.
Abram, 352 U.S. 432 (1957), where the Supreme
Court held that an involuntary blood sample test
administered to an unconscious patient did not vio-
late the fourteenth amendment, the Court stated:
As against the right of an individual that his
person be held inviolable, even against so slight
an intrusion as is involved in applying a blood
test of the kind to which millions of Americans
submit as a matter of course nearly every day,
must be set the interests of society in the scien-
tific determination of intoxication, one of the
great causes of the mortal hazards of the road.
352 U.S. at 439.
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because there was no compelling state interest
in obtaining the surgically removed bullet.198
Finally, the dissenting opinion by Judge Ro-
binson objects to the approval of a court-or-
dered surgical operation on policy grounds,
arguing that judges are not equipped to deter-
mine the reasonableness of a surgical search
and seizure because they lack the medical ex-
pertise that is necessary to evaluate the validity
of medical testimony provided by the State.1 99
Unlike other search and seizure contexts in-
volving governmental encroachments on the
privacy of homes, cars, papers and other ef-
fects, there are virtually no judicial precedents
or prevailing medical principles which can help
guide the court in determining the reasonable-
ness of a surgical operation.200 On this ground
alone, the dissent in effect argues that there
should be a per se rule against all court-ordered
surgical operations.2 °1
The Crowder -decision has significantly de-
parted from prior case law on the issue of
fourth amendment reasonableness. Previous
state decisions have held that a non-consensual
surgical operation by the State is constitution-
ally reasonable, within the meaning of the
fourth amendment, only if the operation is
medically characterized as "minor surgery."
But the Crowder decision admonishes the courts
to look beyond the nature and the degree of
risk involved in a surgical operation. The court
holds that a non-consensual surgical operation
by the State must appear to be reasonable and
justified from the totality of facts and circum-
stances. The decision in United States v. Crowder
is likely to encourage future efforts by prose-
cutors to surgically invade the body of an
108 The dissent stated that "the evidentiary signifi-
cance of the bullet lay solely in its tendency to show
that Crowder was present at the scene of the crime-
a fact never in dispute at Crowder's trial." 543 F.2d
at 322 (Robinson, J., dissenting).1
99 Id. at 322-23.200 Id. at 323.
2 1 Id. Furthermore, the dissent states:
[D]espite the judge's best effort to conduct a
full and fair adversary hearing on the medical
characteristics of a surgical search, it cannot
realistically be assumed that access to medical
experts is equal as between the prosecution and
the defense. So, not only may the degree of
genuine conflict in medical opinion not be un-
covered but, where conflicts do emerge, the
judge's lack of medical expertise may well make
it difficult for him to resolve them.
Id. at 323-24.
accused person in search of evidence of a
crime.
MEDIA AcCESS TO PRISONS
In Garrett v. Estelle20 2 the District Court for
the Northern District of Texas held that an
absolute ban on news media access to prisoners
on death row and to executions of prisoners
violated the first amendment's guarantee of
freedom of the press. The Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit in KQED, Inc. v. Houch-
ins2 3 upheld an injunction which required news
media representatives to be given greater access
to prisons than that afforded the general pub-
lic. Both of these cases are in apparent conflict
with Supreme Court decisions governing the
media's right to gather news within prison
walls.
The Supreme Court first actively discussed
the right to gather news as a corollary to the
first amendment guarantee of freedom of the
press in Branzburg v. Hayes.204 The Court stated
that "without some protection for seeking out
the news, freedom of the press could be evis-
cerated."2 °5 Two years later in Pell v. Procu-
nier2 0 and in Saxbe v. Washington Post Co. 207 the
Court attempted to delineate the scope of this
right to gather news in the context of media
access to prisons and prisoners.
Pell upheld the constitutionality of a Califor-
nia Department of Corrections regulation
which provided that "press and other media
interviews with specific individual inmates will
not be permitted. °2 0 8 The Court reasoned that
the rights of the press were not infringed
because the regulation merely eliminated a
special access privilege which had once been
given to the press. 09 The general public, how-
ever, had never been allowed to walk in and
interview prisoners absent some special rela-tionship, 210 and the Court stated that as a
202 424 F. Supp. 468 (N.D. Tex. 1977).
203 546 F.2d 284 (9th Cir. 1976).
-4 408 U.S. 665 (1972). See also Comment, The
Right of the Press to Gather Information after Branzburg
and Pell, 124 U. PA. L. REv. 166 (1975).
205 408 U.S. at 681.
2 0 417 U.S. 817 (1974).
207 417 U.S. 843 (1974).
208 417 U.S. 817, 817 (quoting CALIFORNIA DEPART-
MENT OF CORRECTIONS MANUAL § 415.017).
209 417 U.S. at 831.
210 Family, clergy, prior acquaintances and lawyers
were permitted to talk to specific inmates. Id. at 830-
31. The Court noted that if this relationship existed
between a member of the press and an inmate, he
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matter of law "newsmen have no constitutional
right of access to prisons or their inmates
beyond that afforded the general public." ''
Therefore, a regulation which in effect im-
posed an absolute ban212 on media interviews
with individually designated inmates was not
unconstitutional.
This limitation on the press' right of access
was reiterated the same day in Saxbe, a case
involving substantially the same arguments as
Pell but dealing with a Policy Statement of the
Federal Bureau of Prisons. 21 3 The policy pro-
hibited personal interviews in all federal me-
dium and maximum security facilities. 214 The
Court noted that aside from face-to-face inter-
views "members of the press are accorded sub-
stantial access to the federal prisons." 
2
15
In neither Pell nor Saxbe did the Court rely
on the traditional balancing approach to first
amendment questions in determining the me-
dia's access rights.2 16 In Pell the Court treated
prisoners' rights of free speech and the media's
right of access in separate portions of its opin-
ion. The Court did balance the prisoners' rights
would not be precluded from interviewing the pris-
oner. Saxbe, 417 U.S. at 847.
211 417 U.S. at 834.
1
12 Id. at 836 (Justice Douglas used the phrase
"absolute ban" in his dissent).
213 Bureau of Prisons Policy Statement 1220.1A
4b(6) states:
Press representatives will not be permitted to
interview individual inmates. This rule shall ap-
ply even where the inmate requests or seeks an
interview. However, a conversation may be per-
mitted with inmates whose identity is not to be
made public, if it is limited to the discussion of
institutional facilities, programs and activities.
417 U.S. at 844 n.1.
214 The regulation was applicable to approximately
75% percent of all federal prisons. 417 U.S. at 844.
215 Id. at 847. According to the Court the press was
permitted to tour and photograph prison facilities.
Media members could also carry on unlimited corre-
spondence with inmates, interview randomly selected
prisoners and obtain information from prison offi-
cials. Id. at 847-48.
216 In dealing with first amendment rights the
Court traditionally has tailored restrictions to meet
specific governmental interests. For example, in Pro-
cunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396 (1974), which in-
volved censorship of prisoners' mail, the Court
stated, "First, the regulation ... must further an
important or substantial governmental interest unre-
lated to the suppression of [speech] .... Second, the
limitation ... must be no greater than is necessary
or essential to the protection of the particular govern-
mental interest involved." Id. at 413.
of free speech against the government's penal
objectives of isolation of prisoners, rehabilita-
tion and prison security. 2 17 But in its analysis
of the media's rights, rather than expressly
balancing those rights against competing gov-
ernmental interests, the Court focused on the
fact that the challenged regulation eliminated
a special privilege. In Saxbe the Court explicitly
rejected the need to balance media first amend-
ment rights against governmental interests.
In this case, however, it is unnecessary to engage
in any delicate balancing of such penal consider-
ations against the legitimate demands of the
First Amendment. For it is apparent that the
sole limitation imposed on newsgathering ... is
no more than a particularized application of the
general rule that nobody may enter the prison
and designate an inmate whom he would like to
visit, unless the prospective visitor is a lawyer,
clergyman, relative, or friend of that inmate.
218
In spite of the approach and explicit lan-
guage of Pell and Saxbe, the district court in
Garrett v. Estelle21 9 ruled that the Texas Depart-
ment of Corrections ban on news media access
to prisoners on death row and to executions of
prisoners violated the first amendment.22 0 The
217 417 U.S. 817, 822-23 (1974).
218 417 U.S. 843, 849 (1974).
219 424 F. Supp. 468 (N.D. Tex. 1977).
220 The Texas Code of Criminal Procedure gov-
erns access to prisoners:
Visitors
Upon the receipt of such condemned person
by the Director of the Department of Correc-
tions, he shall be confined therein until the time
for his execution arrives, and while so confined,
all persons outside of said prison shall be denied
access to him, except his physician and lawyer,
who shall be admitted to see him when necessary
to his health or for the transaction of business,
and the relatives, friends and spiritual advisors
of the condemned person, who shall be admitted
to see and converse with him at all proper times,
under such reasonable rules and regulations as
may be made by the Board of Directors of the
Department of Corrections.
TEx. CODE CRIM. PRoc. ANN. art. 43.17 (Vernon
1966). Article 43.20 states:
Present at Execution
The following persons may be present at the
execution: the executioner, and such persons as
may be necessary to assist him in conducting the
execution; the Board of Directors of the Depart-
ment of Corrections, two physicians, including
the prison physician, the spiritual advisor of the
condemned, the chaplains of the Department of
Corrections, the county judge and sheriff of the
county in which the Department of Corrections
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court sought to distinguish Pell and Saxbe on
factual grounds. First, in Pell and Saxbe the
press sought to report on the daily activities of
the prison, whereas the reporters in Garrett
sought coverage of a controversial matter of
public importance -capital punishment.221 The
court stated that, "[t]he people through these
representatives must have access to the dun-
geons and the 'death rows' so that the people
remain aware of the workings of their govern-
ment. If there is any subject about which the
people have a 'right to know,' surely it is
this. 22 2 Second, in-Pell and Saxbe the press was
free to go on tours of the prison facilities and
to interview inmates if encountered. Members
of the press could also talk to recently released
prisoners. No such substantial public access to
the prisoners existed in Garrett, according to
the court. Since the prisoners on death row
were not likely to be released, the press was
limited to gathering news by means of corre-
spondence with inmates or by means of inter-
views with family, friends, clergy or lawyers
permitted to see the prisoners. 223 Finally, the
court stated that the Supreme Court in Pell
and Saxbe was concerned with the prospect that
press interviews might diminish the deterrent
and rehabilitative value of imprisonment. Since
the prisoners in Garrett were sentenced to
death, rehabilitation was not a consideration.2 2 4
This attempt to distinguish Garrett from Pell
on the facts is less than satisfactory. While the
public interest has focused on capital punish-
ment recently, concerns about prison condi-
tions or particular crimes and criminals which
were raised in Pell are also matters of public
interest. There is no sound reason to distin-
guish these cases on the public's passing fancy.
Certainly first amendment guarantees should
is situated, and any of the relatives or friends of
the condemned person that he may request, not
exceeding five in number, shall be admitted. No
convict shall be permitted by the prison authori-
ties to witness the execution.
TEx. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 43.20 (Vernon
1966).
221 424 F. Supp. at 471.
2 2Id.
Id.
224 The court also noted that unlike the situation
in Pell, media interviews had never jeopardized
prison security nor had they created disciplinary
problems. Additionally there was no evidence that
the interviews permitted prior to the promulgation
of the Texas regulation caused administrative incon-
venience. Id.
not flicker so capriciously. Concededly, with
regard to the court's other points, Pell did
express concern about rehabilitation and the
possible negative effects media exposure might
have on the deterrence of crime, but these
arguments were used primarily to justify cur-
tailment of prisoners' rights to solicit interviews.
While related to media access, these considera-
tions were largely irrelevant to the media's free-
dom to initiate interviews. Thus, these consid-
erations do not advance the argument favoring
media access in Garrett.
The California regulation upheld in Pell and
the federal prison policy sustained in Saxbe
prohibited interviews with specific inmates ex-
cept by family, prior friends, clergy and law-
yers. The Texas regulations also provided for
interviews by these categories of individuals.22
However, the Texas regulations also denied
any public access to death row prisoners and
executions. Consequently no media members,
unless they happened to fall within the ex-
empted catagories, could interview a prisoner
or witness an execution. The Supreme Court
in Pell and Saxbe was not confronted with the
question of an absolute ban on both public and
media access to prisons. Yet under the logic of
Pell since the general public was denied access
to the prisoners, the press would also face
complete denial of access .
226
The court's conclusion that "[t]o permit such
a ban on access to a public institution, where
there is no need or justification for it, would
be to permit arbitrary, capricious and unrea-
sonable restraints to be placed upon the right
of the people to know what their own govern-
ment is doing ' 227 is in essence based on a
balancing of interests. The government had
argued that the interests of human dignity and
taste justified the ban. The court rejected this
argument as both ironic and beyond the scope
ofjudicial consideration. "Unless there is some
22 See note 220 supra.
226 This situation is precisely what prompted Jus-
tice Powell to dissent to that portion of Pell dealing
with media rights. Justice Powell explained his posi-
tion fully in Saxbe when he stated, "From all that
appears in the Court's opinion, one would think that
any governmental restriction on access to informa-
tion, no matter how severe, would be constitutionally
acceptable to the majority so long as it does not
single out the media for special disabilities not appli-
cable to the public at large." 417 U.S. at 857 (Powell,
J., dissenting).
227 424 F. Supp. at 472.
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substantial factual basis for denying access to
public proceedings, it is for the news media
itself to determine what governmental activities
are sufficiently tasteful, dignified, or acceptable
to be reported .... In addition, the people
themselves are the final masters of what they
consume. 228 This focus on the question of
whether the media's right to gather news on a
controversial topic of public interest out-
weighed the government's expressed concerns
of taste and human dignity implicitly rejects
the Supreme Court's approach in both Pell and
Saxbe.
In KQED, Inc. v. Houchins,22 9 a three-judge
panel of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit considered media access in light of an
Alameda County general policy which excluded
members of the media from its jail facilities
and limited public access to the facilities to
tour groups of twenty-five people booked long
in advance. The use of cameras, sound equip-
ment and all conversations with inmates were
prohibited on such tours.2 30 The panel in three
separate opinions upheld a district court in-
junction prohibiting the county jailor from ban-
ning the media from jail facilities. 231 Judge
Pregerson 23 1 writing the opinion of the court
recognized that on its face the injunction
2/d. at 473.
229 546 F.2d 284 (9th Cir. 1976).
2130 97 S. Ct. 773, 774 (1977) (Rehnquist, J., in
chambers).
21 The injunction issued by the United States
District Court for the Northern District of California
prevented the Alameda County jailor:
From excluding as a matter of general policy
plaintiff KQED and responsible members of the
news from the Alameda County Jail facilities
... or from preventing ... full and accurate
coverage of the conditions prevailing therein.
... From denying KQED ... access ... at
reasonable times and hours.
... From preventing KQED ... from utilizing
photographic and sound equipment or from
utilizing inmate interviews . . . [the jailor] may,
in his discretion, deny KQED ... access ... for
the duration of those limited periods when ten-
sions in the jail make such media access danger-
ous.
97 S. Ct. 773, 773-74 (1977). The district court
granted the preliminary injunction on November 20,
1975. A two-judge panel of the Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit stayed the district court order on
December 24, 1975. A different panel of the Ninth
Circuit heard the appeal. Id. at 774.
232 The Honorable Harry Pregerson, United States
District Court Judge for the Central District of Cali-
fornia, sitting by designation.
granted the media greater access than the pub-
lic to the jail. However, he saw no conflict with
Pell, which he felt stands for the proposition
that the media's right of access is coextensive
with the public's right. It does not, however,
compel identical implementation of the media's
and the public's right of access since, "[t]he
access needs of the news media and the public
differ.... Moreover, the administrative prob-
lems inherent in public and media access dif-
fer." 23 He therefore concluded that "[a]though
both groups have an equal constitutional right
of access to jails, because of differing needs
and administrative problems, common sense
mandates that the implementation of those
correlative rights not be identical.
2 3
1
Judge Hufstedler, concurring specially,
2
35
agreed with Judge Pregerson that the court's
decision was consonant with Pell. Crucial to
her opinion that neither Pell nor Saxbe com-
pelled the use of the same standards of access
for the public and the press was her belief that
Pell merely dealt with the type of information
the public had a "right to know." If the public
was entitled to access to a certain type of
information, the media had equal right to the
information. In contrast to Pell's focus on the
type of information sought, Judge Hufstedler
pointed out that the issue before the court in
Houchins was the limitation that can be imposed
on the means to gather the information. Thus,
Pell and Saxbe were not directly on point.236
Judge Hufstedler noted that media and pub-
lic access to prisons posed different administra-
tive problems which she felt justified different
access restrictions in gathering news which the
public is entitled to know.2 3 7 She also recog-
nized that public tours and news media access
do not serve identical purposes, although both
are in pursuit of information which the public
has a "right to know." The function of the
press is to disseminate the information to a
wide public audience. This function would not
be performed adequately by a group of individ-
uals on tours because "it would be rare that the
2-1 546 F.2d at 286.2
3
4 Id.
235 Id. at 295 (Hufstedler, J., concurring specially).
2  Id.
23 Judge Hufstedler noted, for instance, that while
it would be burdensome for groups of citizens to
examine the preparation of prison food, a small
group of reporters would create little administrative
inconvenience. Id. at 296.
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combination of training and the means of
transmission enjoyed by the news media would
be found in a tour group." 23 Furthermore,
she asserted that conducted tours do not serve
to give "an adequate view" of prison condi-
tions.239
Regardless of Judge Hufstedler's ingenuity
in interpreting Pell, the result she sanctions
seems to conflict with the holding of that case.
Judge Duniway,240 while concurring, recog-
nized this conflict, "I concur, but I confess to
having serious doubts about the result, not
because I think that it is wrong in principle,
but because I have great difficulties in reconcil-
ing the results with ... [Pell and Saxbe]."24' He
expressed the belief that the press in our com-
plex society should have a preferred right of
access to discover facts about the public's busi-
ness and that the law should recognize the
differing administrative burdens present in
media and public access. 242 He candidly admit-
ted, however, that Pell and Saxbe do not recog-
nize these differences and in fact "expressly
disregard" them .243
Both Garrett and Houchins implicitly consider
the rule of law announced in Pell to be over-
broad. Both appear to utilize the traditional
first amendment approach of balancing rights
and interests rejected by Pell and Saxbe. Yet
arguably the holding of each case can be rec-
onciled with Pell and Saxbe. Although the Su-
preme Court did not emphasize the importance
of substantial access to prisons and prisoners,
it did mention that substantial access other
than specific interviews existed in Pell and
Saxbe.214 In contrast, Garrett involved an abso-
= Id.
239Id.
240 546 F.2d at 294 (Duniway, J., concurring).
241 Id.
242 Id. at 294-95.
243 Id. at 295.
244 See note 215 supra and accompanying text.
lute ban on media and public access to death
row prisoners and executions, and the Alameda
County general policy in Houchins allowed only
extremely limited access. If the doctrine of Pell
is impliedly limited to situations where substan-
tial access already exists, then Garrett and
Houchins are not necessarily in conflict.
Sheriff Houchins raised this issue in making
application to Justice Rehnquist to stay the
district court injunction. 245 Justice Rehnquist
granted the stay because of the likelihood that
the Court would grant certiorari "if for no
other reason than that departure from un-
equivocal language in [Pell]. "246 He did, nev-
ertheless, suggest that the question of substan-
tial access mighit be the key to resolving the
apparent conflict with the prior Court deci-
sions. 247 It should be noted, however, that the
use of substantial access as a standard for
judging the constitutionality of restrictions on
media access to prison will force courts to
consider each particular fact situation and to
examine the reasonableness of any challenged
restriction. This approach would clearly be a
retrenchment from Pell's rigid language which
focused purely on equality of access.
Both Garrett and Houchins reflect dissatisfac-
tion with the flat rule of law announced in Pell.
This malcontent has placed the nature of media
access to prisons and prisoners in doubt. The
Supreme Court now has the opportunity to
elucidate the first amendment standard appli-
cable to media access to prisons and prisoners.
24 8
245 97 S. Ct. 773, 774-75 (1977) (Rehnquist, J., in
chambers).246 Id. at 775.
247 Justice Rehnquist stated that "if 'the no greater
access' doctrine of Pell and Saxbe applies ... the
Court of Appeals and the District Court were wrong
.... If on the other hand, the holding in Pell is to
be viewed as impliedly limited to the situation where
there is already substantial press and public access to
the prison, then Pell and Saxbe are not necessarily
dispositive." Id.248 The Supreme Court granted certiorari in
Houchins on May 23, 1977. 97 S. Ct. 2630 (1977).
